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ABSTRACT 
 
Uber has reached rock-star status in the world of ‘gigs’, ‘rabbits’ and ‘rides’ 
known as the ‘on-demand economy’.  Uber is but one in a sea of online platforms 
that seek to link clients with workers offering traditional services like transport, 
cleaning, repairs or running errands.  These platforms act as a mediator between 
clients and workers and often set minimum quality standards, manage the payment 
process as well as the supply of work.  However, as these platforms gain 
prevalence in today’s labour market, the question of worker protection comes 
rushing to the fore.  On the one hand, these platforms are praised for having 
reduced the barriers to income for individuals who might not readily be able to enter 
the traditional labour market.  On the other hand, critics of the on-demand economy 
argue that companies, like Uber, shift risks to their employees by misclassifying 
them as independent contractors, thereby weakening labour protections and driving 
down wages and in favour of their own profit margins. 
The question of whether Uber drivers are employees or independent 
contractors has sparked debate in the US.  This study seeks to engage in this 
debate albeit in the South African context.  In the absence of a definitive 
pronouncement from a South African decision maker as to the status of Uber 
drivers, the core research question posed by this study is whether Uber drivers are 
employees under South African law.  The objective of the study is to determine 
whether existing labour laws in South Africa offer adequate protection to workers, 
like Uber drivers, in the on-demand economy.  It will be argued that Uber drivers do 
not neatly fall within the definition of employee in section 213 of the LRA.  However, 
Uber drivers do not neatly fit the category of independent contractor either.  The fact 
that the aspects of the ‘uberfied’ work relationship do not seem to speak to the 
factors enumerated in the South African tests of employment suggests that perhaps 
these factors are outdated in the context of the on-demand economy.   
But, this is not a new problem.  It will be argued that the problems faced by 
‘gig’ workers in the on-demand economy should be viewed as an extension of a 
broader trend towards the casualisation of labour.  In this sense, it can be said that 
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the type of work relationship created by companies like Uber, is simply an 
‘uberfication’ of the status quo.  In other words, companies like Uber have done no 
more than give the non-standard employee a smart phone application with which to 
earn an income.   
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION TO GIGS, RABBITS AND RIDES  
 
Jan Theron, writing in 2003 about the process of externalisation and the global 
shift to services said that ‘employment is not what it used to be’.1  That statement is 
even more accurate today with advent of the ‘on-demand economy’.  The on-
demand economy2 goes by many names; it has been referred to as the ‘gig 
economy’,3 the ‘sharing economy’4 and the ‘peer economy’5 amongst others.  These 
names are used broadly to refer to any socially networked system that relies on 
coordinating networks of people.6  The on-demand economy has come to be known 
for its innovative use of websites and mobile applications which link workers to 
clients seeking services, at the click of a mouse or the tap of a phone screen.7  
Work in the on-demand economy is characterised as ‘flexible, autonomous and 
short term in nature.’8 The tasks performed by workers are often referred to as ‘gigs’ 
which speaks to the perceived impermanence of work relationships in the on-
demand economy.9 
There are broadly two kinds of work that takes place in this economy, ‘crowd 
work’ and ‘work on-demand via apps’.10  The first category of work entails the 
                                               
1 Jan Theron ‘Employment Is Not What It Used To Be’ (2003) 24 ILJ 1247 at 1247.  
2 Elizabeth J Kennedy, ‘Employed by an Algorithm: Labor Rights in the On-Demand Economy’ 
(2017) 40 Seattle U.L. Rev. 987 at 1000.  
3 Valerio de Stefano ‘The Rise of the “Just-In-Time-Workforce”: On-demand work, crowd work and 
labour protection in the gig economy’ (Geneva ILO, 2016) Conditions of Work and Employment 
Series No. 71 
4 Denise Cheng ‘Is Sharing Really Caring? A Nuanced Introduction To The Peer Economy’ (October 
2014), Open City Foundations, available at  https://static.opensocietyfoundations.org/misc/future-of-
work/the-sharing-economy.pdf, accessed on 12 June 2018.  
5 Ibid.  
6 Cheng op cit. n4 at 2.  
7 Emily C. Atmore ‘Killing the Goose that Laid the Golden Egg: Outdated Employment Laws are 
Destroying the Gig Economy’ (2017) 102 Minn. L. Rev. 887 at 888.  
8 Ibid.  
9 Ibid; See also, Geoff Nunberg ‘Goodbye Jobs Goodbye Jobs, Hello 'Gigs': How One Word Sums 
Up A New Economic Reality’, NPR 11 January 2016, available at 
https://www.npr.org/2016/01/11/460698077/goodbye-jobs-hello-gigs-nunbergs-word-of-the-year-
sums-up-a-new-economic-reality, accessed on 22 December 2018.  
10 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 1.  
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completion of a series of tasks via online platforms.11  Amazon Mechanical Turk 
(“MTurk”) is one of the more famous examples of a crowd work platform.  Workers 
are linked to clients to perform discreet tasks virtually.12  These tasks can range 
from ‘simple data validation and research to more subjective tasks like survey 
participation, content moderation’.13  Workers engaged in crowd work have been 
referred to as the ‘invisible workers’ because the nature of their work means that 
they may never ‘meet’ the client to whom they render services.14   
The second category of work involves the execution of traditional services like 
transport, cleaning, repairs or running errands by workers who sign up to online or 
mobile platforms like TaskRabbit, GigWalk, FieldAgent, Uber and Lyft to name a 
few (this is truly the tip of the iceberg15) which link the worker to clients seeking 
these services.16  The platform typically sets minimum quality standards, manages 
the payment process and the selection and management of the workforce.17   
However, as these platforms gain prevalence in today’s labour market, the 
question of worker protection comes rushing to the fore.  On the one hand, these 
platforms are praised for having ‘significantly reduced the barriers to reliable, 
independent income’18 thereby facilitating economic growth and the ‘empowerment 
of ordinary people’.19  On the other hand critics argue that, far from engendering a 
culture of sharing, companies like Uber shift their operational risks to workers by 
                                               
11
 Ibid.  
12 Unknown Author ‘Overview’ Amazon Mechanical Turk Website available at 
https://www.mturk.com/, accessed on 22 December 2018.  
13 Ibid.   
14 de Stefano op cit. n3 at 21.  
15 See, Sajad ‘Top 100 Gig Economy Jobs Like Uber’ Hurdlr, 23 February 2018 available at 
https://www.hurdlr.com/blog/on-demand-economy-gigs, accessed on 22 December 2018.  
16 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 1.  
17 Ibid.  
18 Cheng op cit. n4 at 17.  
19 Juliet Schor ‘Debating the Sharing Economy’ Great Transition Initiative (Oct, 2014) available at 
https://www.greattransition.org/publication/debating-the-sharing-economy, accessed on 22 
December 2018.  
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misclassifying them as independent contractors, thereby weakening labour 
protections and driving down wages and in favour of their own profit margins.20   
The focus of this study is Uber because of the prevalence that it has gained as 
a platform that offers ‘work on-demand via apps’, the second category referred to 
above.  Uber has reached rock-star status in the world of ‘gigs’, ‘rabbits’ and ‘rides’ 
since it was first launched in San Francisco in 2010.21  Uber owns and operates a 
smartphone application which ‘mediates demand between two user groups’ namely, 
Uber drivers and riders seeking transportation services (“the Uber App”).22  The 
company has broadened its reach to over 250 cities and in 2015, a mere five years 
since its launch, its valuation was said to be at $70 billion.23  In 2017, a 
spokesperson reported that Uber had roughly 2 million drivers globally and 
approximately 750 000 in the United States.24  If these statistics are indeed correct 
then it is clear that the growth of this kind of work, being work performed via mobile 
or online applications, is significant.   
However, Uber’s rise to stardom has not been without its proverbial bumps in 
the road.  Uber has faced considerable backlash from regulators in certain countries 
with its operations being suspended in Bulgaria, Finland, France and the 
Netherlands for failing to comply with existing taxi regulations.25  Vancouver, British 
Columbia is amongst one of the countries that has banned ride-hailing apps 
                                               
20 Avi Shaprio ‘Against Sharing’, Jacobin, September 2019, available at 
https://www.jacobinmag.com/2014/09/against-sharing/, accessed on 22 December 2018.  
21 Richard Koch ‘How Uber Used a Simplified Business Model to Disrupt the Taxi Industry’, 
Entrepreneur, 3 January 2017, available at https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/286683, accessed 
on 22 December 2018.  
22 Uber South Africa Technology Services (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Public Service and Allied 
Workers (“NUPSAW”) and others [2018] 4 BLLR 399 (LC) at 3.  
23 Ibid.  
24 Sara Ashley O’Brien ‘Uber has more work to do winning over drivers’, CNN Business, 18 
December 2017 available at https://money.cnn.com/2017/12/18/technology/uber-drivers-180-days-
of-change/index.html., accessed on 22 December 2018.  
25 Anna Rhodes ‘Uber: Which Countries have Banned the Controversial Taxi App’, Independent, 22 
September 2017, available at https://www.independent.co.uk/travel/news-and-advice/uber-ban-
countries-where-world-taxi-app-europe-taxi-us-states-china-asia-legal-a7707436.html, accessed on 
2 January 2019.  
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altogether in favour of its local taxi services, although this ban may not be 
permanent.26   
In those cities where Uber does operate, it has been the subject of legal action 
from its drivers who allege that Uber has misclassified them as independent 
contractors and is accordingly in contravention of the applicable labour laws. The 
most notable of these cases are two US class action suits, O’Connor v Uber 
Technologies Inc.27 (“O’Connor v Uber”) and Razak v Uber Technologies, Inc28 
(“Razak v Uber”).  In both cases, decided in different jurisdictions, the court was 
required to determine whether the drivers were independent contractors as a matter 
of law in order to justify an order granting Uber its motion for summary judgment.  A 
further case that has been widely reported involves Uber’s competitor in the US, 
Lyft which operates along much the same lines as Uber.  In Cotter v Lyft Inc. 
(“Cotter v Lyft”)29 the court was also required to determine whether the Lyft drivers 
were independent contractors as a matter of law for purposes of determining 
whether Lyft was entitled to summary judgment.  
These cases are discussed in further detail in Chapter Four below.  The 
crucial point to be made at this juncture is that the contrasting judgments of Judge 
Chen in O’Connor v Uber30 and Judge Baylson in Razak v Uber31 suggest that the 
task of classifying on-demand workers in terms of existing US labour laws is no 
easy task.  As judge Chhabria notes in Cotter v Lyft32, a decision maker ‘will be 
handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes’.33  In the US 
there is some consensus amongst academics that one of the major challenges for 
                                               
26 Josh Martinez ‘Which Cities Have Banned Ride-Sharing Apps?, Passport Health, 13 June 2018, 
available at https://www.passporthealthusa.com/2018/06/which-cities-have-banned-ride-sharing-
apps/, accessed on 2 January 2019.  
27 O’Connor v Uber Technologies, Inc. 82 F Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (2015).  
28 Razak v Uber Technologies, Inc., CV 16-573, 2018 WL 1744467 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 11, 2018) 
available at https://www.isdc.ch/media/1591/14-razak-v-uber.pdf.  
29 Cotter v Lyft Inc. 60 F. Supp 3d 1067 (2015).  
30 O’Connor v Uber supra n27.  
31 Razak v Uber supra n28.  
32 Cotter v Lyft supra n29.  
33 Cotter v Lyft supra n29 at 19.   
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US labour law is the fact that many of the common law tests seem to be outdated in 
the context of the on-demand economy.34   
Uber launched in South Africa during 2013 and since then the country has 
seen several bouts of protest action from Uber drivers, protesting against unfair 
working conditions,35 and traditional taxi drivers, protesting against unfair 
competition from Uber drivers.36  During July 2018 Uber drivers protested outside 
Uber’s Johannesburg Offices.37  The drivers claimed that they often struggled to 
make ends meet working for Uber as the company unilaterally dropped prices which 
made covering expenses a difficult if not impossible task for the drivers.38 
However, there has yet to be a definitive pronouncement on the employment 
status of Uber drivers in South Africa.  The case of Uber South Africa Technology 
Services (Pty) Ltd v National Union of Public Service and Allied Workers 
(“NUPSAW”) and others.39 (“Uber SA v NUPSAW”) concerns an application 
brought by Uber Technologies (Pty) Ltd (“Uber SA”) to review and set aside a 
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (“CCMA”) in limine 
jurisdictional ruling.  The CCMA Commissioner (“the Commissioner”) held that the 
Uber drivers were employees of Uber SA as contemplated in section 213 of the 
Labour Relations Act40 (“LRA”) and accordingly the CCMA had jurisdiction to hear 
the unfair dismissal claims brought by the Uber drivers.41   
                                               
34 John A. Pearce II & Jonathan P. Silva, ‘The Future of Independent Contractors and Their Status 
as Non-Employees: Moving from a Common Law Standard’ (2018) 14 Hastings Bus. L. J. 1; See 
also, Atmore op cit. n7.   
35 Ernest Mabuza ‘This is why I’m striking – Uber driver explain how petrol hikes have nearly crippled 
him’, Times Live, 4 July 2018, available at https://www.timeslive.co.za/news/south-africa/2018-07-04-
this-is-why-im-striking--uber-driver-explains-how-petrol-hikes-have-nearly-crippled-him/, accessed on 
15 January 2019.  
36 Lizeka Tandwa ‘ “Uber is Killing Us” – Protesting Metered Taxi Driver”, News24, 10 March 2017, 
available at https://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/uber-is-killing-us-protesting-metered-taxi-
driver-20170310, accessed on 15 January 2019.  
37 Mabuza op cit. n 35.   
38 Ibid.  
39 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22.    
40 Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995.   
41 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 24.   
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However, the Commissioner conflated the distinction between Uber BV, the 
company that owns and operates the Uber App, and Uber SA, a company that 
provides support and maintenance services to Uber BV.42  Accordingly, the question 
of whether the Uber drivers were employees of Uber BV, who was not a party to the 
proceedings in the CCMA or the Labour Court, remains to be determined.43  In the 
Labour Court decision, Judge Andre van Niekerk notes that each of the building 
blocks of the drivers’ case pertains to Uber BV and not Uber SA’.44   
This study seeks to engage in the debate as to the status of Uber drivers and 
whether they are adequately protected by labour laws, albeit in a South African 
context.  The objective of this study is to determine whether existing labour laws in 
South Africa offer adequate protections to workers in the on-demand economy.  As 
employee status is seen to be the golden ticket to these protections, the core 
research question is thus whether Uber drivers, being Uber ‘partner-drivers’ as 
defined in Chapter Two below, are employees in terms of South African labour law.   
It will be argued that the factors enumerated in the South African common law 
tests of employment do not easily fit the circumstances of the ‘gig’ workers working 
arrangements.  As a follow on from this contention, the study will interrogate 
whether the ‘gig’ worker is really something new to the labour market.  In other 
words, are ‘gig’ workers and the challenges faced by them something completely 
different to the workers that have been ‘located in a grey area between employment 
and self-employment’45 since the end of the twentieth century or is the ‘gig’ worker 
ultimately the same thing (albeit in trendier clothing).  It will be argued in Chapter 
Seven of this dissertation, that the ‘uberfied’ work relationship can be seen as a 
modern manifestation of the process of externalisation; an ‘uberification’ of the 
status quo if you will.   
Relative to the US, there is very little South African judicial or academic 
comment on this subject.  In the circumstances, the research question is addressed 
                                               
42 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 31.  
43 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 38.  
44 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 37.  
45 Paul Benjamin ‘An Accident of History: Who is (And Who Should Be) an Employee under South 
African Labour Law’ (2004) 25 ILJ 787 at 789.  
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through a comparative analysis of the relevant US and South African case law and 
legislation.  Moreover, the study will also draw on certain secondary sources such 
as books, journal articles and ILO working papers to bolster the analysis.  It is noted 
that the dissertation relies on numerous web articles.  Given that the on-demand 
economy and companies like Uber are fairly new to the labour market these articles 
are useful in that they provide access to the most recent developments in case law, 
protest action, Uber’s business model, amongst others and public opinion in respect 
thereof.   
Chapter Two of this study is an introduction to Uber’s business model and the 
categories of drivers that are registered on the Uber App.  It will be noted that this 
study is only concerned with one category of Uber drivers namely, ‘partner-drivers’ 
who own their own vehicles and who register on the Uber App and carry out rides in 
their personal capacity.  To avoid confusion, any reference to ‘driver’ or ‘Uber driver’ 
in this dissertation must be construed as a reference to the Uber ‘partner-driver’ 
category unless expressly stated otherwise.  The Chapter will also provide some 
insight into the ‘on-boarding’ process that drivers must undergo in order to be 
activated on the Uber App as well as Uber’s interactions with the drivers post 
activation.   
Chapter Three examines the US labour law system and entails an overview of 
the key pieces of US labour legislation as well as the common law tests of 
employment.  The purpose of this Chapter is to provide a framework within which to 
discuss the cases in which the US courts have been asked to determine whether 
Uber drivers, and Lyft drivers, are employees or independent contractors.  It will be 
argued in this Chapter that one of the major challenges facing US labour law is the 
fact that many of the common law tests of employment are outmoded in the context 
of the on-demand economy.  This means that workers in the on-demand economy, 
like Uber drivers, are not adequately protected by existing labour laws because the 
task of classifying them is difficult and does not lend itself to a certain outcome.   
Chapter Four is an analysis of the cases in which the US courts have been 
asked to determine whether drivers in the on-demand economy are employees or 
independent contractors.  The Chapter includes an analysis of two cases decided 
13 
 
under California law involving Uber drivers and Lyft drivers, O’Connor v Uber46 and 
Cotter v Lyft47 as well as the case of Razak v Uber48 which was decided under 
Pennsylvania law.   
Chapter Five includes an overview of the development of South African labour 
law, labour legislation and the common law test of employment.  Chapter Six seeks 
to address the core research question posed by this study namely, whether Uber 
drivers are employees under South Africa law.  In the absence of a definitive 
pronouncement from a South African decision-maker as to the status of Uber 
drivers, this Chapter will draw on the reasoning of the US courts as well as the as 
the findings of the CCMA Commissioner referred to in SA v NUPSAW.49  Chapter 
Six will also examine the challenges of the current tests of employment in South 
Africa in the context of the on-demand economy.  
Chapter Seven addresses the question of whether the ‘gig’ worker is 
something new to the existing labour market.  It will be argued that it is not and as 
de Stefano asserts, the on-demand economy should not be seen as a ‘parallel 
universe’ to the existing labour market.50  Accordingly, there is a kinship between 
the ‘gig’ worker and those non-standard employees who occupy the ‘grey area 
between employment and self-employment’.51  Chapter Seven will also consider the 
concept of ‘dependent self-employment’ being an intermediate category between 
employee and independent contractor status.52  Chapter Eight concludes this minor 
dissertation.  
  
                                               
46 O’Connor v Uber supra n27.  
47 Cotter v Lyft supra n29.  
48 Razak v Uber supra n28.  
49 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22.   
50 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 6.  
51 Benjamin op cit. n45 at 789.  
52 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 8. 
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CHAPTER 2: UBER, ALL ABOARD! 
 
I. UBER AND THE DISTRUPTION OF THE TRADITIONAL TAXI SECTOR  
Uber first launched the Uber App in San Francisco in 2010 following the 
economic downturn of 2008.53  The Uber App is a smartphone application that 
‘mediates demand between two user groups’ namely, Uber drivers and riders 
seeking transportation services.54  Uber is said to have disrupted the traditional 
sector in that it has ‘created a far more efficient market for car hire services.’55  The 
Uber App has substantially reduced the transaction costs typically associated with 
the traditional taxi sector.56  The most significant of these are the search costs 
borne by metred taxi companies.57   
A day in the life of a traditional metred taxi cab driver would typically entail 
driving around for several hours or congregating in high-demand areas, such as the 
airport, in the hopes of finding a willing customer.  These wasted search costs 
would be borne by the metred taxi company, if that company had classified its 
drivers as employees, or the metred taxi driver, if he or she was an independent 
contractor, and in some instances would far outweigh the amount earned from rides 
completed.  At this juncture it should be pointed out that Uber’s classification of its 
drivers as independent contractors is not unique to its business model and in fact 
many metred taxi companies have employed this strategy for years.58  In addition, 
the problem of poaching rides is common in the metred taxi industry.59  A customer, 
frustrated with having to wait for a taxi driver to arrive after having been dispatched 
                                               
53 Koch op cit. n21.   
54 Uber SA v NUPSAW op cit. n22 at 3.  
55 Brishen Rogers, ‘The Social Costs of Uber’ (2015-2016) 82 U.Ch.L Rev. Dialogue 85 at 86.  
56 Rogers op cit. n55 at 87.  
57 Rogers op cit. n55 at 88.  
58 Rogers op cit. n55 at 89.  
59 Rogers op cit. n55 at 88. 
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from the central dispatch unit may hail another cab.60  The dispatched cab would 
thus lose out on the fare.61  
The Uber App has eliminated these search costs by providing technology that 
links riders to drivers operating nearby.  A rider need only sit back and watch the 
driver approach using the Uber App’s tracking function.  In addition, the Uber App 
manages supply in high-demand areas, such as the airport, by only permitting a 
certain amount of drivers to queue in such areas.62  Furthermore the Uber, and 
companies like it, have seemingly reduced the risks traditionally associated with 
transacting with strangers.  Importantly, by verifying and clearing the payment 
between drivers and riders, Uber arguably facilitates transactions that may 
otherwise not occur due to the lack of trust between strangers.63   
In addition, it has been argued that Uber’s feedback and rating function 
encourages good behaviour amongst riders and drivers alike.64  Although riders and 
drivers cannot select who they wish to transact with (Uber automatically pairs riders 
with drivers nearby) the Uber App manages which parties can remain on the Uber 
App according to their rating level.  Accordingly, a driver that regularly drives 
recklessly and is disrespectful to riders is likely to fall below Uber’s minimum 
requirements due to negative ratings from customers.  Likewise, a rider that 
routinely gets drunk and throws up in a driver’s car and barks obscenities at drivers 
may be deactivated from the Uber App.65   
Thus, on the face of it, Uber has significantly reduced the barriers associated 
with the traditional taxi sector.  For riders, this means lower fares and a more 
efficient means of getting from A to B without worrying about long waits, fraud or 
                                               
60 Ibid.  
61 Ibid.   
62 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 15.  
63 Adam Thierer, Chris Koopman, Anne Hobson and Chris Kuiper ‘How the Internet, the Sharing 
Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the Lemons Problem’ (2016) 70 Miami L. 
Rev 830 at 863.  
64 Thierer et al op cit. n63 at 868.  
65 ‘Uber Community Guidelines’ Uber Website available at https://www.uber.com/en-
AU/legal/community-guidelines/ssa-en/ accessed on 9 February 2019.  
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abuse.  For drivers, this is seemingly an easier access of earning income as the 
Uber App is seen to facilitate transactions that might otherwise not occur.   
II. THE PARTIES TO THE ‘UBERFIED’ WORK RELATIONSHIP  
In the absence of having sight of Uber’s company structure, the task of 
defining Uber as a corporate entity is a difficult task, it is likely that Uber has a 
complex company structure through which it operates globally.  In Uber SA v 
NUPSAW66 the Labour Court notes that there is a distinction between Uber BV, the 
company that owns and operates the Uber App, and Uber SA, a company that 
provides support and maintenance services to Uber BV.67  In the cases of O’Connor 
v Uber68 and Razak v Uber69 the party cited as being the owner and operator of the 
Uber App is Uber Technologies Inc. (“Uber Inc.”).  It is not crucial to this study to 
pinpoint the exact corporate entity that owns and operates the Uber App.  However, 
for the sake of clarity any reference to ‘Uber’ in this dissertation is a reference to the 
entity that owns and operates the Uber App (whether that is Uber BV, Uber Inc. or 
another corporate entity altogether).   
Uber distinguishes between three categories of relationship.  The first category 
is the ‘partner-driver’ which refers to a partner of Uber who owns one or more 
vehicles, which have been registered under his or her profile on the Uber App, and 
who has registered with Uber as a driver and is authorised to make use of the Uber 
App to complete rides.  The second category refers to ‘drivers’ only.  These are 
individuals who do not own their own vehicles, but instead complete rides using 
vehicles owned by Uber ‘partners’, discussed below.  Uber ‘drivers’ are registered 
as drivers on the Uber App and are authorised by Uber to complete rides.  The final 
category is Uber ‘partners’.  This category is made up of individuals that own one or 
more vehicles that have been registered with Uber but do not drive for Uber.  Uber 
‘partners’ typically contract with drivers in the ‘driver’ category.  The nature and 
content of these contracts may vary.  This study is concerned only with the first 
                                               
66 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22.  
67 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 31.  
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category, namely ‘partner-drivers’ and accordingly any reference to ‘driver’ or ‘Uber 
driver’ in this dissertation is a reference to this category unless the contrary is 
expressly stated.   
An driver (being either a ‘partner-driver’ or a ‘driver’) who wants to become an 
Uber driver is met with the following message upon entering Uber’s webpage –  
 ‘Uber needs partners like you.   
Drive with Uber and earn great money as an independent contractor.  Get paid 
weekly just for helping our community of riders get rides around town.  Be your own 
boss and get paid in fairs for driving on your own schedule’ [emphasis added] 
Accordingly, from the get-go Uber is careful to make it clear that the 
relationship between itself and its drivers is not one of employment but rather a 
‘partnership’ between itself and its drivers albeit with Uber calling most of the shots.  
The ‘pull’ of working for Uber is that Uber drivers are encouraged to be their own 
bosses, set their own schedules and (allegedly) make a whack of cash doing it.  
The extent to which this is an accurate reflection of the uberfied work relationship is 
examined in the following Chapters.   
III. THE ‘ON-BOARDING’ AND ‘ACTIVATION’ PROCESS  
To be activated on the Uber App, an Uber driver must undergo the following 
‘on-boarding process’, which appears from the judgment of Judge Andre van 
Niekerk in Uber SA v NUPSAW70 and Judge Chen in O’Connor v Uber,71 
respectively –  
 the Uber driver must create a profile on the Uber website by registering 
a username and password;72 
 in the course of the online registration process, the Uber driver is 
required to agree to Uber’s driver privacy statement and thereafter 
                                               
70 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22.  
71 O’Connor v Uber supra n27.  
72 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 11.  
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receives an SMS prompt to upload his or her valid South African 
driver’s license and a professional driver’s permit onto his profile;73 
 once the documentation furnished by the driver has been verified by 
Uber the driver receives an email, generated by Uber, informing him or 
her of the next steps;74 
 having completed the online registration process, the driver is required 
to attend a driving competency test and screening process conducted 
by a third party service provider.75  This competency test essentially 
entails to a background check, city knowledge exam, vehicle inspection 
and a personal interview.76 The competency and screening process is 
paid for by the Uber driver;77 
 Thereafter, the driver is invited to attend an information session which is 
a two hour session that takes place at one of Uber’s local offices.78  
Drivers are provided with information on how to operate the Uber App 
and how to use navigation using Google maps amongst others.79  In 
addition, Uber provides ‘suggestions and best practices on how to 
maintain good ratings from riders’ amongst others.80   
In order to be ‘activated’ a driver must agree to be bound by Uber’s standard 
terms and conditions contained in its services agreement and driver addendum.  
The material terms of this agreement include, inter alia, –  
                                               
73 Ibid.  
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid; See also, ‘Onboarding Process: How to Create Your Profile’ Uber Webpage available at 
https://www.uber.com/en-ZA/drive/cape-town/get-started/competency-test-and-screening-session/, 
accessed on 9 February 2019.  
76 O’Conner v Uber supra n27 at 12.  
77 The Uber Webpage states that a driver is required to bring R300 to cover the costs of the 
onboarding requirements (eg screening check, driving evaluation etc.); see ‘Onboarding Process: 
How to Create Your Profile’ op ci. n77.  
78 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 12.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Ibid.  
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 Uber does not control or direct the drivers in the performance of 
transportation services of the maintenance of the driver’s vehicle;81 
 the drivers retain the right to determine how long and how often they 
will use the Uber App;82  
 ‘Uber does not guarantee drivers a minimum of riders’;83 
 Uber drivers remain solely responsible for generating his or her own 
income and managing his or her own expenses;84 
 Uber drivers retain the right to provide transportation services to other 
companies;85 
 the parties to the agreement expressly agree that the relationship 
created between them is that of a principle and an independent 
contractor;86 
 in particular, the parties agree that the services agreement concluded 
between them is not an employment contract nor does it create an 
employment relationship between Uber and the driver.87 
The credit or debit card details of each rider are stored on his or her profile on 
the Uber App.88  Uber facilitates the payments between drivers and riders by 
deducting the fares from the rider using the details provided by him or her.89  The 
fares accumulated by a driver are transferred from Uber to the Driver’s nominated 
bank account on a weekly basis with Uber deducting a 20 percent management fee 
                                               
81 Ibid.  
82 Ibid.  
83 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 13.  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid.  
86 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 12.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Uber SA v NUPSAW supra n22 at 13. 
89 Ibid. 
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in respect of each ride completed by the driver.90  The fares are calculated on the 
basis of the distance travelled by the rider and the duration of the ride.91  These 
fares are set unilaterally by Uber with no input from drivers.92   
Riders and drivers rate each other by using the Uber App’s feedback and 
rating system.  At the end of a trip, riders and drivers are invited to give each other a 
rating from one to five.  Uber’s ‘Community Guidelines’ stipulate that riders can be 
deactivated from the Uber App if they damage drivers’ or other passengers’ 
property, use abusive language or gestures or break the law whilst using Uber, 
amongst others.93  Likewise, drivers will be deactivated from the Uber App either 
permanently or temporarily if their rating falls below the minimum standards 
prescribed by Uber.94  The driver’s rating takes into account the scores given to the 
driver by riders as well as his or her acceptance and cancellation rates.95  
Accordingly, a driver that frequently accepts and cancels rides, before collecting a 
rider, will be assigned a lower overall score.96 
It will be argued in the chapters that follow that many of the aspects of the 
uberfied work relationship seem to point to an employment relationship whereas 
others do not.  The extent to which Uber’s rating and feedback function affords the 
company significant control over the manner in which its drivers perform their 
transportation services has been the subject of debate in the US.  On the one hand, 
it has been suggested that function effectively renders Uber drivers observable at all 
times.97  On the other hand, this function has been interpreted as a mechanism 
intended to ensure the quality of service provided by Uber and the safety of its 
riders.98  In terms of the latter view, the nature of the relationship between Uber and 
                                               
90 Ibid.  
91 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 4. 
92 Ibid.  
93 ‘Uber Community Guidelines’ op cit. n65.   
94 Ibid.  
95 Ibid.  
96 Ibid.  
97 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 24.  
98 Razak v Uber supra n28 at 30.  
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its drivers is more akin to the relationship between a homeowner and a 
subcontractor engaged in the renovation of a house.99  The homeowner may 
impose certain requirements upon the subcontractor which only subsist while the 
subcontractor is in the home ‘and certainly do not suffice to conclude that [the 
subcontractor] is an employee’ of the homeowner.100 
The remainder of this study is dedicated to determining whether the ‘uberfied’ 
work relationship is something that falls within the ambit of traditional employment.  
The question of whether Uber drivers are employees or independent contractors is 
examined in the following Chapters.   
  
                                               
99 Ibid.  
100 Ibid.   
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CHAPTER 3: LABOUR LAW IN THE US 
 
There have been a number of cases in the US which have dealt with the 
question of whether drivers for on-demand ride hailing companies, such as Uber 
and Lyft, are employees or independent contractors.  The most notable of these 
cases are O’Connor v Uber,101 Razak v Uber102 and Cotter v Lyft.103   
These cases are discussed in further detail in Chapter Four.  The purpose of 
this Chapter Three is to provide a legal framework within which to analyse the US 
cases involving Uber, and its competitor Lyft.  Part I provides an overview of the 
doctrine of at-will employment.   
Part II examines the relevant provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act 
(“FLSA”)104, the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”)105 and Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act (as amended) (“Title VII”).106  These statutes have been incorporated 
into the United States Code (“US Code”), which is prepared and published by the 
Office of the Law Revision Counsel of the US House of Representatives and 
contains the general and permanent laws of the US.107  In addition, Part II of this 
chapter sets out the various tests that have been developed at common law to 
distinguish between employees and independent contractors.   
Part III summarises the challenges faced by the US labour system in 
responding to the problem of worker classification in the on-demand economy.  It 
will be argued that the multiplicity of common law tests applied in the US together 
                                               
101 O’Connor v Uber supra n27.  
102 Razak v Uber supra n28.  
103 Cotter v Lyft supra n29.  
104 8 Fair Labor Standards, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 to 219 (2018), Cornell Law School Legal Information 
Institute, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/chapter-8.  
105 7 Labor Management Relations, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 151 – 169 (2018) Cornell Law School Legal 
Information Institute, available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/29/chapter-7.  
106 21 Civil Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (2018) Cornell Law School Legal Information 
Institute ,available at https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/42/chapter-21.  
107 ‘About the United States Code and this Website’ Office of the Law Revision Counsel: United 
States Code, available at http://uscode.house.gov/about_code.xhtml accessed on 27 December 
2018.  
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with the fact that the factors applied in these tests make the task of classifying Uber 
drivers.     
I. THE DOCTRINE OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT  
At will-employment is the default rule in all US states except for Montana108 
and is widely accepted as the ‘governing principle’ of the US labour markets.109  In 
terms of the doctrine of at-will employment, an employment contract that does not 
stipulate a termination date is presumed to be for an indefinite period and may be 
terminated ‘at-will’ and without reason. 110  The doctrine is premised on the notion 
that the employment relationship is voluntary and both the employer and the 
employee have equal leverage to negotiate the terms of the employment contract, 
as Means and Seiner note ‘the right to fire is equivalent to the right to quit’.111   
In theory, the right to quit guarantees that workers own their own labour and 
are able to sell their labour on the market for the highest value.112  On the other end 
of the spectrum, at-will employment affords employers the right to hire and fire ‘at-
will’ and ‘as the economy waxes and wanes, thus maximizing the economic 
efficiency of their operations.113 
The doctrine should be viewed within its historical context though.  The idea 
that the principle of freedom of contract should come to surpass the paternalistic 
master-servant view of employment, in terms of which the master is responsible for 
the well-being of the servant, arose in response to economic and social changes in 
the US during the end of the 19th century.114 As the US became more industrialised, 
employers needed the flexibility to adjust the size of their labour force in order to 
                                               
108 ‘The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule”, National Conference of State Legislatures, 
available at http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-will-employment-overview.aspx 
accessed on 27 December 2018.  
109 Benjamin Means and Joseph A Seiner, ‘Navigating the Uber Economy’ (2016) 49 U.C.D. L. Rev. 
1511. 
110 Cheryl S. Massingale, ‘At-Will Employment: Going, Going…’, 24 U. Rich. L. Rev. (1990) 187 at 
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113 Means and Seiner op cit. n109 at 1520.  
114 Massingale op cit. n110 at 188.  
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meet changing market demands.115  Against this background, Massingale asserts 
that the doctrine is perhaps best understood as an expression of the principle of 
freedom of enterprise as opposed to the principle of freedom of contract.116 
However, the employer’s right to terminate the employment relationship ‘at-will’ 
and without reason has been significantly curtailed by the development of statutory 
and common law exceptions to the default rule.117  For example, at common law an 
employee may be compensated for wrongful discharge where an employer 
dismisses the employee for a reason that is contrary to public policy.118  In addition, 
the US courts have recognised that an employer’s conduct (whether by way of 
practice or policy) may imply that a permanent contract of employment, terminable 
only on just cause shown by the employer, has been established between the 
parties notwithstanding the conclusion of an at-will agreement between them.119 
These exceptions operate in recognition that more often than not the 
economic reality of the labour market is such that employees do not enjoy the same 
level of flexibility as employers and accordingly do not sit at the negotiating table 
with equal leverage to negotiate fair terms for their employment.120   
II. US LABOUR LEGISLATION AND THE COMMON LAW TESTS OF 
EMPLOYMENT 
The legislative and judicial interventions discussed in Part I protect employees 
from being treated as ‘at-will’ employees by employers where the substance of the 
relationship or fairness dictates that they should not be.  The problem of disguised 
employment is obviously not unique to the at-will employment scenario and with the 
advent of statutory and judicial interventions aimed at protecting employees in unfair 
dismissal claims, employers and employees alike have generally become savvier in 
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negotiating at-will employment contracts.121  A scenario that is arguably more 
prevalent is the case of employers misclassifying workers as independent 
contractors in order to maintain economic flexibility and to side-step the costs 
associated with traditional employment.122 
In the US, employee status is the golden ticket to a suite of employment 
legislation that was enacted at federal and state levels during the course of the 20th 
century to protect employees from the whims of employers and/or the vagaries of 
the market.  The NLRA, which was enacted in 1935, regulates collective bargaining 
and unfair labour practices.  In terms of section 157 US Code employees have the 
right to form and join labor organisations and to collectively bargain through 
representatives of their choosing.  
In terms of section 158(1) of the US Code, it is an unfair labour practice for an 
employer to ‘interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the 
rights guaranteed in section 157’.123  In addition, it is considered an unfair labour 
practice for an employer to discriminate against employees on the basis of their 
membership or non-membership in a labour organisation whether such 
discrimination occurs by way of the employer’s hiring or firing practices or any term 
or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labour 
organization.124  Independent contractors are expressly excluded from the definition 
of employee under the NLRA.125 
The FLSA is a federal law that was enacted in 1938 at the tail end of the Great 
Depression in order to alleviate the harsh conditions that workers had been made to 
endure.126  The FLSA establishes –  
‘minimum wage, overtime pay eligibility, record keeping, and child labor standards 
affecting full time and part-time workers in the private sector and federal, state and local 
governments’
127  
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123 7 Labor Management Relations, 29 U.S.C. s158 (2018). 
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125 7 Labor Management Relations,29 U.S.C. s152(3) (2018). 
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The FLSA defines an employee as ‘any individual employed by an 
employer’128 and an ‘employer’ is defined as ‘any person acting directly or indirectly 
in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee’.129  The definition of 
‘employ’ in the FLSA includes ‘to suffer or permit to work’130 and is purposefully 
broad in order to prevent employers from manipulating the work relationship in order 
to avoid the costs and obligations associated with traditional employment.131  A 
person ‘suffers or permits’ an individual to work if, as a matter of economic reality, 
the individual is dependent on that person.132  Title VII prohibits dismissals on the 
basis of race, colour, religion, sex or national origin.133  Only certain employees, 
falling within the ambit of Title VII, are entitled to bring discrimination, harassment or 
retaliation claims under the act.134   
Historically, the legislature justified the exclusion of independent contractors 
from employment legislation on the basis that employees were, by contrast, typically 
less skilled and lacked the flexibility to sell their labour on the open market and were 
consequently more vulnerable and in need of legislative protection as a result.135  
The archetype of an independent contractor is as an entrepreneur with specialised 
skills who is able to demand higher pay on the open market for the services 
provided by him or her.136 
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However, Means and Seiner note that in a pre-modern economy the question 
of who was an employee would have been fairly obvious in most circumstances.137  
As the US became more industrialised and employers began to shift from traditional 
employment the picture became less clear.  Accordingly, the US courts developed a 
number of tests to determine whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor, properly construed, and thus entitled to the rights and protections 
afforded by federal and state legislation.  
The common law tests find application depending on the statute and 
jurisdiction in question in a particular case.138  The most widely used tests are, the 
common law ‘right-to-control’ test or the ‘agency’ test, the ‘economic realities’ test, 
the ‘hybrid’ test and the International Revenue Service’s twenty factor test (“IRS 
test”), which is primarily used for tax cases.139   
The common law ‘right-to-control’ test is the primary test applied to the 
classification of workers in the US and is applicable ‘in any situation related to 
employment where no statutory definition of employment has been given or where 
the given definition is only nominal’.140  The Restatement (Second) of Agency141 
(“Restatement”) is the predominant articulation of the common law test and defines 
an ‘employee’ as –  
‘a servant hired to perform services in the affairs of another and who with respect to the 
physical conduct in the performance of the services is subject to the other’s control or 
right to control.’142 [emphasis added]  
The Restatement provides the following non-exhaustive list of ten factors to 
consider in determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent 
contractor:   
(1) the extent of control which, by agreement, the master may exercise over the 
details of the work;  
                                               
137 Means and Seiner op cit. n109 at 1524.  
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(2) whether or not the one employed is engaged in a distinct occupation or business;  
(3) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the employer or by a specialist without 
supervision;  
(4) the skill required in the particular occupation;  
(5) whether the employer or the workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and 
the place of work for the person doing the work;  
(6) the length of time for which the person is employed;  
(7) the method of payment, whether by time or by the job;  
(8) whether or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer;  
(9) whether or not the parties believe they are creating the relation of master and 
servant; and 
(10) whether the principal is or is not in business.143 
The factors are to be considered simultaneously and balanced against each 
other with no single factor being definitive.144  The overarching enquiry is ‘whether 
the employer retains the right to control the manner and means by which the 
product is accomplished.’145   
The ‘economic realities’ test, like the ‘right-to-control’ test, considers the extent 
to which the employer controls or has the right to control the manner in which the 
work is performed, but also looks to the extent to which the workers are 
economically dependent on the employer’s business.146  The purpose of the test is 
to determine whether the economic reality of the work relationship is such that the 
worker is economically dependent on the employer or whether the worker is in 
business for himself, as an independent contractor.147   
The courts consider the following six factors in applying the ‘economic 
realities’ test: 
(1) the degree of control exerted by the alleged employer over the worker; 
(2) the worker’s opportunity for profit or loss;  
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(3) the worker’s investment in the business;  
(4) the permanence of the working relationship;  
(5) the degree of skill required to perform the work; and  
(6) the extent to which the work is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business.148 
The ‘hybrid’ test is a combination of the common law ‘right-to-control’ test and 
the ‘economic realities’ test.149  In terms of the ‘hybrid’ test, although the economic 
reality of the work relationship is critical, the employer’s right to control the work 
process is the determining factor.150  In assessing the extent of the employer’s right 
of control, the court’s will examine a number of factors including the six factors of 
the ‘economic realities’ test151 and ‘the putative employer’s right to hire and fire, 
supervise, and control the worker’s work schedule’.152   
The IRS test is used to determine employment status for the purposes of 
withholding taxes.  One of the driving factors for misclassifying workers as 
independent contractors is the fact that employers are not responsible for 
withholding income taxes, withholding and paying Social Security and Medicare 
taxes or paying unemployment taxes on wages to employees, in respect of 
independent contractors.153  The twenty factors have been divided into three 
categories namely behavioural, financial and type of relationship.154   
The abovementioned tests are those most commonly applied to the 
interpretation of federal employment statutes.  It has been said above that the type 
of test that will be applied will depend on the statute and the jurisdiction in 
question.155  The Supreme Court has confirmed that the common law ‘right-of-
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control’ test is to be applied where ‘no statutory definition of employment has been 
given or where the given definition is only nominal’.156   
The Supreme Court has further confirmed that the more expansive ‘economic 
realities’ test as opposed to the common law ‘right-to-control’ test is to be applied to 
cases concerning the rights afforded under the FLSA.157  This is because the FLSA, 
unlike other employment statutes, contains a more expansive statutory definition of 
employment.158  The legislature intended the FLSA to have the widest application to 
include workers who would not been considered ‘employees’ prior to its 
enactment.159  However, Pearce and Silva note that despite the Supreme Court’s 
pronouncement on when the ‘right-to-control’ test is to be applied, the common law 
tests are often applied inconsistently by the courts.160  Pearce and Silva argue that 
this has led to confusion and ambiguity with regard to the legal classification of 
workers in the US.161   
To add to the confusion, many states make use of different tests to determine 
whether workers are employees or independent contractors.  It is beyond the scope 
of this dissertation to provide a detailed analysis of the common law tests applied in 
the various jurisdictions.  The courts in O’Connor v Uber162 and Cotter v Lyft163 
applied the test established in Borello & Sons v Dep’t of Industrial Relations164 to 
determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors (“the 
Borello test”).165  Recently however, the California Supreme Court rejected the 
Borello test and applied the ‘ABC’ Test in the case of Dynamex Operations West, 
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Inc. v Superior Court of Los Angeles County166 (“Dynamex”).  The case of Razak v 
Uber167 was decided in Pennsylvania accordingly the court applied the factors 
established in the case of Donovan v DialAmerica Marketing Inc.168(“Donovan”) 
(“the Donovan Test”).  These tests are discussed in turn below.    
In terms of the Borello test there is a presumption of employment when a 
worker establishes that he or she has provided services to a putative employer.169  
The burden then shifts to the employer to rebut the presumption of employment.170  
In determining whether an employer has successfully rebutted the presumption of 
employment the court will examine a number of factors the ‘most significant 
consideration’ being the employer’s right to control the manner in which the work is 
performed.171   
The Supreme Court of California held in Borello that the right need not extend 
to every possible detail of the work instead the enquiry is whether the employer 
retains ‘all necessary control’ over the manner in which the work is performed.172  
The court further held that the employer’s right to discharge at will and without 
cause is strong evidence in support of the existence of an employment relationship 
between the parties.173 In addition to the employer’s right to control the court 
identified the following ‘secondary indicia’ –  
a) whether the one performing services is engaged in a distinct occupation or 
business;  
b) the kind of occupation, with reference to whether, in the locality, the work is 
usually done under the direction of the principal or by a specialist without 
supervision;  
c) the skill required in the particular occupation;  
d) whether the principal or the worker supplies the instrumentalities, tool, and the 
place of work for the person doing the work;  
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e) the length of time for which the services are to be performed;  
f) the method of payment, whether by the time or by the job;  
g) whether or not the work is part of the regular business of the principal; and 
h) whether or not the parties believe that they are creating the relationship of 
employer-employee174 
The court further identified the following additional factors for consideration –  
1) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial 
skill;  
2) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his 
task, or his employment of helpers;  
3) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;  
4) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; 
5) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the employer’s business.175 
The Supreme Court held that the Borello factors are not to be applied 
‘mechanically as separate tests; they are ‘intertwined and their weight often 
depends on particular combinations.’176  In the case of Narayan v EGL, Inc.177 the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the decision maker is required to –  
‘assess and weigh all of the incidents of the relationship with the understanding that no 
one factor is decisive, and that it is the rare case where the various factors will point 
with unanimity in one direction.’
178 
The ‘ABC’ test is a simplification of the common law ‘right-to-control’ test.  The 
‘ABC’ test is used by various states to determine the classification of workers for 
purposes of establishing whether an employer is obliged to pay unemployment 
taxes.179  It will be noted that employers are not obliged to pay unemployment taxes 
in respect of independent contractors.  In terms of the ‘ABC’ test, a worker is an 
independent contractor if the hirer establishes -  
a) that the worker is free from control and direction of the hirer in connection with the 
performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of such work 
and in fact;  
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b) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s 
business; and 
c) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, 
occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring 
entity.180 
Unlike the ‘Borello test’, in terms of which the onus of proving an employment 
relationship rests firstly with the worker, the ABC Test proceeds from the 
assumption that the worker is an employee.  It is thus for the hirer to establish that 
the employee is an independent contractor.  It can therefore be argued that the 
‘ABC’ test places a heavier burden on hirers and is more pro-employee in 
comparison to other common law tests.  
Although Dynamex181 does not concern Uber or Lyft drivers but rather drivers 
for a same day delivery company, it is useful to the present study because the 
finding of the Supreme Court California has set a precedent in employee 
misclassification disputes which will render it far more difficult for hirers to classify 
workers as independent contractors.182  The response from government and the 
private sector is telling.  The week after the Dynamex decision was handed down, 
US Senator Bernie Sanders introduced a bill that would establish an ABC Test 
equivalent as the standard for federal labour laws.183  It has been reported that 
businesses and the Chamber of Commerce have been lobbying congressional 
offices to blunt the impact of the bill.184   
In Pennsylvania, the seminal case for determining whether a worker is an 
employee for the purposes of the FLSA is Donovan185 in which the court established 
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six factors to determine whether an employment relationship exists between a 
worker and a putative employer namely –  
1) the degree of the alleged employer’s right to control the manner in which the work 
is to be performed;  
2) the alleged employee’s opportunity for profit or loss depending on his managerial 
skill;  
3) the alleged employee’s investment in equipment or materials required for his task 
or his employment of helpers;  
4) whether the service rendered requires a special skill;  
5) the degree of permanence of the working relationship; and 
6) whether the service rendered is an integral part of the alleged employer’s 
business.186 
In contrast to California’s Borello test in terms of which the primary enquiry is 
putative employer’s right-to-control the manner and means of accomplishing the 
desired result, the Donovan factors are to be applied with a view to determining 
whether, ‘as a matter of economic reality… individuals are dependent upon the 
business to which they render a service.’187  A court applying the Donovan factors is 
required to ‘examine the circumstances of the whole activity’ with no one factor 
being dispositive.188   
III. THE US CHALLENGE – SO MANY (OUTMODED) TESTS SO LITTLE 
CERTAINTY  
This Chapter has canvassed numerous common law tests for employment.  
The decision to apply one test over another depends on the statute from which the 
employment rights arise as well as the jurisdiction in which the dispute has 
arisen.189  The business of classifying workers is rendered more difficult by the fact 
that many of these tests involve a multiple factors that, once applied, can produce 
conflicting results.190  Moreover, many of these tests were developed during a time 
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when employment looked very different to the way it does today and accordingly 
may not speak to certain aspects of the ‘uberfied’ work relationship.  
In the light of all these tests, it can be argued that US courts have been faced 
with somewhat of a legal quagmire in determining the question of whether drivers in 
the sharing economy are employees or independent contractors as a matter of law.  
It is has been said that companies like Uber and Lyft have made it easier for 
individuals to engage in economic activity through the use of smartphone 
applications.  However, the judgments of Judge Chen and Judge Chhabria in the 
cases of O’Connor v Uber and Cotter v Lyft on the one hand and Judge Baylson in 
Razak v Uber on the other, make it clear that these companies have also created a 
worker that seems to be more of an amalgamation between employee and 
independent contractor that one or the other.  The question of whether Uber drivers 
are ‘employees’ under US law is critical because ‘employee’ status is still the 
threshold requirement for workers to receive protection under US law.  If it is so that 
Uber drivers are not independent contractors, capable of holding their own in the 
labour market, then their exclusion from labour protections may have dire 
consequences for a class of potentially vulnerable workers.  The following Chapter 
Four examines the manner in which the US courts have grappled with the 
classification of Uber drivers, as well as the drivers of its competitor Lyft.  
  
                                                                                                                                                
FedEx Home Delivery v NLRB, 563 F.3d 492 (D.C. Cir. 2009) and Alexander v FedEx Ground 
Package Sys. Inc., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Circ. 2014).  
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CHAPTER 4: UBER AND LYFT IN THE US COURTS - SQUARE PEGS, 
ROUND HOLES 
 
The cases of O’Connor v Uber191 and Cotter v Lyft192 are examined in Parts I 
and II of this chapter.  It will be noted that both of these cases have been decided 
under California law, accordingly these parts are concerned with the application of 
the Borello193 test to the relationship between Uber or Lyft and their drivers.   
Part III is an analysis of Judge Baylson’s judgment in Razak v Uber194.  The 
case was decided in Pennsylvania and accordingly, Part III includes an analysis of 
the application of the Donovan195 test to the relationship between Uber and the 
Uber drivers in that case.   
I. O’CONNOR V UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC.196 
a) Background 
The case of O’Connor v Uber197 has wound its way through the US courts 
since 2013 when Uber drivers filed a class action law suit in the Federal District 
Court for the Northern District of California alleging that they had been misclassified 
as independent contractors by Uber.  The drivers alleged that they were employees 
of Uber and were accordingly entitled to the protections afforded by the California 
Labor Code.198   
The case was almost settled in 2016, when Uber agreed to a $100 000 000 
settlement of the misclassification claims.199  Pursuant to the settlement agreement, 
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Uber agreed to implement a number of policy changes including the recognition of a 
Driver Association with which Uber agreed to engage in discussions regarding 
issues of driver concern on a quarterly basis200.  It was further agreed that Uber 
would not be able to deactivate drivers at will instead drivers could only be 
deactivated for just cause, excluding low acceptance rates.201  Finally, it was agreed 
that Uber drivers would be permitted in terms of the agreement to place signs in 
their cars notifying riders that tips are not included, but are appreciated.202  
However, the settlement was rejected by the federal judge on the basis that it was 
not fair adequate and reasonable.203   
The Ninth US Circuit Court of Appeals has recently reversed the class 
certification order in the case of O’Connor v Uber204 on the basis that the arbitration 
clause in Uber’s partner-driver agreements prohibits class action suits.205  In the 
circumstances, those drivers cited in the class action suit have been urged to sign 
up for individual arbitration.206    
However, notwithstanding the fact that the case will not be heard by a jury, the 
findings of Judge Chen in the order denying Uber summary judgment207 (“summary 
judgment order”) offers useful insight into the nature of the Uber partner-driver 
relationship and the challenge of classifying drivers in the on-demand economy.  In 
concluding the summary judgment order, Judge Chen notes that the application of 
the traditional test of employment, the Borello test in the state of California, creates 
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‘significant challenges’ as many of the Borello factors appear to be ‘outmoded’ in 
the context of the sharing economy.208 
b) Application of the ‘Borello test’  
There are effectively two legs to the Borello test.  In terms of the first leg, there 
is a presumption of employment where an individual establishes that he or she 
provides a service to the putative employer.209  Thereafter the court will consider the 
‘Borello factors’ to determine whether the employer can nevertheless rebut the 
presumption of employment.210 
Judge Chen found that the drivers did provide a service to Uber and were 
accordingly presumptive employees in terms of the ‘Borello test’.211  In reaching this 
conclusion Judge Chen rejected Uber’s argument that the drivers did not provide a 
service to the company because it was not a ‘transportation company’, as 
alleged.212  Uber argued instead that it was a ‘pure “technology company” that 
merely generated “leads” for its transportation providers through its software’.213  
Judge Chen found that this argument was ‘fatally flawed’ in several respects.214  
First, the Judge rejects Uber’s argument that it was a ‘pure “technology 
company”’ on the basis that it focuses exclusively on the ‘mechanics of its platform’ 
and ignores the substance of what the company actually does, namely sells 
rides.215  In this regard, Judge Chen held as follows –  
‘Uber is no more a “technology company” than Yellow Cab is a “technology company” 
because it uses CB radios to dispatch taxi cabs, John Deere is a “technology company” 
because it uses modern irrigation techniques to grow its sugar cane.  Indeed, very few 
(if any) firms are not technology companies if one focuses solely on how they 
create or distribute their products.  If, however, the focus is on the substance of what 
the firsm actually does (e.g. sells cab rides, lawnmowers, or sugar), it is clear that Uber 
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is most certainly a transportation company, albeit a technologically sophisticated 
one’
216 [my emphasis added] 
Second, the fact that Uber’s revenues depend almost exclusively on the 
generation of rides by its drivers lends itself to a finding that the drivers do perform a 
service for Uber.217  Judge Chen held that ‘Uber simply would not be a viable 
business entity without its drivers’.218 
Third, the fact that Uber unilaterally sets the fares that it charges riders, 
without consulting or negotiating the fares with drivers, was further evidence in 
favour of the fact that the drivers performed a service for Uber.219  In this regard, the 
Judge found that Uber acted as more than a ‘mere passive intermediary between 
riders and drivers’.220 
Fourth, the Judge found that Uber ‘exercises substantial control over the 
qualification and selection of its drivers’.221  This, the court held, constituted further 
indicia of Uber’s role as a transportation company as opposed to a software 
provider.222  In particular, the Court took into consideration the fact that Uber 
conducted background checks in respect of its drivers and their vehicles and 
regularly terminated drivers who did not meet these standards.223 
Ultimately, Judge Chen refused Uber’s application for summary judgment and 
held that the matter would need to be referred to trial to be decided by a jury.224  
Uber would only have been entitled to summary judgment if no material facts 
remained in dispute and a reasonable jury considering the undisputed facts could 
reach one conclusion being that the drivers were independent contractors as a 
matter of law.225  In this regard, the court held that the question of whether Uber 
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could terminate the driver’s services as well as the extent to which Uber had the 
right to ‘significantly control the “manner and means” of the [driver’s] transportation 
services’ remained in dispute.226    
In terms of the Borello test, the primary test of employment is whether the 
putative employer has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing 
the desired result.  In the case of Ayala v Antelope Valley Newspapers227 the court, 
quoting Borello228, held that the strongest evidence of right to control is whether the 
putative employer has the right to terminate the service provider at will.    
While the drivers alleged that Uber retained the right to deactivate them at will 
and for any reason, 229 Uber argued that it was only entitled to deactivate drivers 
‘with notice or upon the [driver’s] material breach’ of the service contracts.230  As the 
court ultimately referred the matter to be decided by a jury, it did not make a 
pronouncement as to whether Uber’s right to deactivate the drivers from the Uber 
App amounted to termination of employment although Judge Chen considered that 
many of the ‘Uber documents’ submitted in evidence indicated that Uber regularly 
terminated the accounts of drivers who did not perform up to the company’s 
standards.231   
The nature of the ‘suggestions’ provided by Uber as to the manner in which 
drivers are required to dress, communicate with riders, set radio stations and 
volume and temperature232 were indicative of Uber’s control over the manner and 
means in which the rides are carried out, was also disputed.  The drivers alleged 
that the fact that Uber seeks to control these minor details of the service lends itself 
to a finding that Uber retains the right to, and does in fact, exercise ‘significant 
control over the “manner and means” in which the rides are carried out.  Uber 
                                               
226 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 20 - 21.  
227 Ayala v Antelope Valley Newspapers 59 Cal. 4th 552 (2014).  
228 Borello op cit. n164 at 350.   
229 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 20.  
230 Ibid.  
231 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 12.  
232 O’Connor v Uber supra n27 at 21.  
41 
 
argued that these were mere suggestions and were not mandatory.233  The court 
found, without deciding, that these ‘suggestions’ could be construed as instructions 
which the Uber drivers were obliged to follow because they were ‘written in the 
language of command’234 and carried the sanction of deactivation from the Uber 
App if not followed.235   
As to the nature of Uber’s ratings and feedback function, Judge Chen notes 
that contrary to Uber’s assertion that there was ‘insufficient monitoring to warrant an 
inference of an employment relationship’ Uber drivers are monitored quite 
pervasively by means of rider ratings and comments.236  In this regard the court 
held that Uber drivers appeared to be monitored more extensively than the drivers 
in Alexander,237 the case Uber sought to rely on in its argument, where the 
employees were subjected to quarterly ride-alongs conducted by FedEx 
management personnel.238  The court in Alexander held that this level of monitoring 
was sufficient to justify a finding that the drivers were employees of FedEx.239 
The main contention put forward by Uber in support of the argument that the 
right-of-control factor had not been met, was the fact that Uber drivers are permitted 
to work as much or as little as they choose.  The court considered the principle 
established in Air Couriers Int’l v Employment Development Department240 and JKH 
Enterprises v Industrial Relations,241 that ‘freedom to choose one’s days and hours 
of work…does not in itself preclude a finding of an employment relationship’.242   
As to the secondary factors of the Borello test, court held that ‘numerous 
factors point in opposing directions’.243 On one hand the fact that driving does not 
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require a special skill is a factor that may weigh in favour of an employment 
relationship.244  In addition, the court held that the drivers form an integral part of 
Uber’s business, indeed Uber ‘simply could not be ‘Everyone’s Private Driver” 
without the Uber drivers, which is another factor that indicates an employment 
relationship.245  On the other hand, the fact that drivers use their own vehicles and 
thus invest significant capital in their trade, may employ others to drive on their 
behalf and signed an agreement stating no employment relationship is created are 
all factors that point to independent contractor status.246 
The court held that it could determine that Uber drivers were independent 
contractors as a matter of law, and accordingly Uber was denied its motion for 
summary judgment.247  In concluding, Judge Chen notes that the application of the 
Borello test to the relationship between Uber and its drivers ‘does not yield an 
unambiguous result’.248  The Judge notes that many of the factors of the tests, 
which evolved under a very different economic model, appear to be ‘outmoded’ in 
the context of the sharing economy.249  Although this case will not be heard before a 
jury, the abovementioned analysis of Judge Chen is useful to the present study as it 
provides some insight into the nature of the ‘uberfied’ work relationship and the 
possible shortcomings of the Borello test.   
II. COTTER V. LYFT, INC.250 
a) Background 
The case was settled during March 2017 with Lyft agreeing to a $27 000 000 
settlement of the misclassification claims as well as the implementation of certain 
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changes to the company’s terms of service for drivers.251  The drivers alleged that 
they were employees of Lyft and accordingly under California law would have been 
entitled to be reimbursed for their expenses, which Lyft did not do.252  In addition, 
the drivers alleged that Lyft sometimes failed to pay the drivers minimum wage.253 
As in the case of O’Connor v Uber,254 the case will not be heard before a jury.  
The court found that the question of whether Lyft drivers were independent 
contractors or employees could not be decided as a matter of law and should be 
decided by a jury.255  However, like the judgment of Judge Chen in O’Connor v 
Uber256 the judgment of Judge Chhabria in the order denying cross-motions for 
summary judgment offers valuable insight into the nature of work in the on-demand 
economy and the challenges of the current common law tests of employment.  The 
oft quoted statement from the judgment neatly summarises the issue –  
‘As should now be clear, the jury in this case will be handed a square peg and asked to 
choose between two round holes.  The test the California courts have developed over 
the 20th Century for classifying workers isn’t very helpful in addressing this 21st Century 
problem.  Some factors point in one direction, some point in the other, and some are 
ambiguous.’257 
b) Application of the ‘Borello test’  
At the outset of his judgment Judge Chhabria notes that ‘at first glance, Lyft 
drivers don’t seem much like employees… but Lyft drivers don’t seem much like 
independent contractors either’.258  This statement appears to sum up the current 
dilemma facing drivers working for ride hailing companies in the on-demand 
economy.  The Judge notes that typically, an employee is regarded as someone 
who ‘works under the direction of a supervisor, for an extended or indefinite period 
of time, with fairly regular hours, receiving more or all of his income from that one 
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employer’.259  Lyft drivers, by contrast, are permitted to work as much as they like, 
or not at all, and are able to schedule their own hours of work.260  In addition, a 
person might drive for Lyft to supplement their primary income.261 
However, the Judge notes that Lyft drivers don’t seem to neatly fit the mould of 
an independent contractor either.  Stereotypically, an independent contractor is –  
‘someone with a special skill (and with the bargaining power to negotiate a rate for the 
use of that skill), who serves multiple clients, performing discrete tasks for limited 
periods, while exercising great discretion over the way the work is actually done’
262 
The court held that an independent contractor would be a person that a 
principle hired in order to perform a task that was often ‘tangential to the day-to-day 
operations’ of his or her business.263  Lyft drivers, by contrast, have no special skills 
and the work they perform is central to Lyft’s business, not tangential.264  In 
addition, although Lyft drivers can choose their own schedules the court found that 
Lyft exercises significant control over the manner in which the drivers perform their 
work including the right to deactivate drivers from the App.265   
As to the first leg of the Borello test, the court rejected Lyft’s argument that the 
drivers do no perform a service for Lyft but rather provides services to Lyft’s 
riders.266  Lyft argued that it merely furnished drivers with the platform to connect 
with riders.267  However, the court found that this argument was ‘not a serious one’ 
as Lyft concerns itself with more than simply connecting drivers with riders.268  
Instead, Lyft is seen to actively market itself to riders as an ‘on-demand ride service’ 
and seeks out those customers.269   
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As to the second leg of the ‘Borello test’, being the consideration of the Borello 
factors, the court held that the question of whether ‘Lyft actually exercises control is 
less important than whether it retains the right to do so’. 270  The court found, that 
notwithstanding that Lyft exercises no control over when Lyft drivers accept rides, 
the ride-sharing company exercises significant control over the manner in which the 
drivers carry out rides once the ride is accepted.271  In addition, the fact that Lyft’s 
‘suggestions’ were written as commands and carried the sanction of deactivation or 
suspension from the App if not followed seemed to weigh in favour of an 
employment relationship.272  Accordingly the court held that the primary factor, 
being the employer’s right to control, appears to weigh in favour of employment 
status.273 
However, with regards to the secondary indicia, the court found that many of 
the factors, once applied to Lyft drivers, appear to cut in opposing directions.274  On 
one hand, the fact that the parties signed an agreement which clearly stipulates that 
the drivers are independent contractors is a factor that supports Lyft’s contention 
that the drivers are independent contractors.275  On the other hand, that drivers do 
not possess special skills and perform work that is ‘”wholly integrated” into Lyft’s 
business’ would cut in favour of an employment relationship.276 
Ultimately, the court held that it could not find that the Lyft drivers were 
independent contractors as a matter of law and accordingly the matter would need 
to be determined by a jury.277  In concluding, Judge Chhabria surmises that perhaps 
the solution to the challenge of applying the traditional California test of employment 
to work relationships in the on-demand economy is that ‘drivers should be 
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considered a new category of worker altogether, requiring a different set of 
protections’.278 
It has been said above that the case of Cotter v Lyft is useful for the present 
purposes because it highlights the challenges of the traditional tests of employment.  
What is clear from the judgment is that the nature of work has changed 
considerably since the time that these tests were developed.  Far from a clear 
distinction between employees and independent contractors, the courts are now 
faced with work relationships that seem to cut both ways.   
III. RAZAK V UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC.279 
a) Background  
The case was brought by drivers representing a class of certified limousine 
drivers who drove for Uber’s luxury UberBLACK service.280  The Uber drivers 
alleged that Uber had misclassified them as independent contractors and that as a 
result of the misclassification Uber had ‘violated federal minimum wage and 
overtime requirements under the FLSA and sought to be compensated by the 
company in respect thereof.281 
b)  Application of the ‘Donovan test’  
In applying the Donovan282 test to the relationship between Uber and the 
drivers, the court found that only two factors weighed in favour of an employment 
relationship namely, that the service rendered by the drivers, driving, did not require 
a special skill and that the drivers are an ‘essential part of Uber’s business as a 
transportation company’.283  Indeed, the court found that Uber would not be able to 
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function without its drivers.284  This is in line with the findings of Judge Chen and 
Judge Chhabria in O’Connor v Uber and Cotter v Lyft, respectively.  
However, as to the remaining four factors, the court found that these lent 
factors themselves to a finding that the drivers were independent contractors and 
not employees as the drivers alleged.  The court’s findings in relation to the first 
factor, the employer’s right to control, contrast the findings in O’Connor v Uber285 
and Cotter v Lyft286.  In the California cases, both Judge Chen and Judge Chhabria 
found that Uber exercises extensive control over the manner and means by which 
drivers carry out rides once accepted.287  In Razak v Uber Judge Baylson held that 
there were significant indications that Uber does not exercise control over the 
drivers.288 
For example, the fact that Uber drivers are able to hire subcontractors to 
perform services on their behalf, are permitted to work for competing ridesharing 
companies and are ‘completely free to determine their working hours’ were all 
indications of independent contractor status.289  In addition, the court understood 
that Uber’s right to deactivate drivers for failing to comply with its standards was a 
mechanism intended to ensure the safety of riders.290 
As to the extent of Uber’s control over its drivers, Judge Baylson likened the 
situation to ‘a carpenter, or a plumber’ who is contracted to renovate a house –  
‘The homeowner may impose certain requirements while the carpenter/plumber is in the 
house, such as not permitting certain fumes, footwear, music, or other conditions – but 
all of these conditions only apply while the carpenter/plumber is in the home – and they 
certainly do not suffice to conclude that the carpenter/plumber is an employee.’291 
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In terms of the second Donovan factor, the employee’s opportunity for profit 
and loss, the court considered that drivers are permitted to work as much or as little 
as they choose and/or for competitor companies if they so choose.292  The fact that 
drivers could choose not to work or to work elsewhere if the opportunity for profit 
was greater as a result, were considerations that weighed in favour of independent 
contractor status.293 
The drivers argued that the second Donovan factor was not satisfied as Uber 
determined whether drivers were allocated rides and controlled the fares in respect 
thereof.  However, the court, quoting Chao v Mid-Atlantic Installation Services 
Inc.,294 held that the second Donovan factor did not require the drivers to be ‘solely 
in control of their profits or losses’.295  The court held that drivers only made money 
once they elected to go online and use the Uber App, only then did the ‘opportunity 
to earn profits begin’.296  On this basis the court held that the second factor favoured 
the conclusion that the drivers were not employees.297 
In respect of the third Donovan factor, the court held that the fact that Uber 
drivers provided the equipment and materials required for the task, namely the car 
and smartphone, also pointed evidenced their status as independent contracts.298  
In addition, with regards to the fifth Donovan factor, the drivers argued that they had 
driven for Uber for many years and for many hours per week which spoke to the 
permanence of the employment relationship.299  However, the court held that this 
fact ‘reflected the [driver’s] choices rather than Uber’s necessity’.300  The court held 
that because driver’s have the freedom to choose whether to drive for Uber and for 
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how long suggested that there was ‘no permanence of the working relationship 
whatsoever, unless the driver wants it’.301 
Given that the majority of the Donovan factors weighed in favour of 
independent contractor status, the court found that the Uber drivers were 
independent contractors as a matter of law and accordingly granted Uber its motion 
for summary judgment.  It was reported that the drivers intend to appeal the 
decision of the court.302 
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CHAPTER 5: LABOUR LAW IN SOUTH AFRICA - A ROUND HOLE OR 
SQUARE PEG?  
 
Chapter Three set out the legislative framework for labour law in the US and 
provided an overview of the various common law tests of employment which are 
applied in the US on the statute and jurisidiction in question.  In addition, Chapter 
Three examined the rationale behind the legislative and judicial interventions that 
were implemented during the twentieth century to countenance the harsh working 
conditions that workers had been subjected to during the latter half of the nineteenth 
century.  The crucial point to be made in this regard, is that the statutory protections 
were put in place in the US in recognition of the fact that the employee’s right to 
quite did not measure up to the employer’s right to hire and fire.  Simply put, 
employees, being typically less skilled than their independent contractor counter 
parts, lacked the flexibility and leverage to negotiate the fair terms of their 
employment contracts and were consequently considered to be more vulnerable to 
the ebbs and flows of the labour market.303  In consequence, employee status 
became the key to a suite of labour protections.   
As the US became more industrialised employers sought to externalise certain 
non-core aspects of their operations in order to gain flexibility to meet changing 
market demands without sacrificing their bottom lines.304  As a result the traditional 
employment relationship began to erode and the question of who was and who 
wasn’t an employee became less clear.  Workers who had been shifted to the 
periphery were classed as independent contractors but did not seem to enjoy the 
same security and leverage as their so-called peer group.  Accordingly, the courts 
developed a number of common law tests to distinguish between employees and 
independent contractors, properly construed.   
South Africa has followed a similar pattern in the development of its labour 
legislation and the common law tests for employment. Legislative intervention into 
the South African common law contract of employment arose from the recognition 
                                               
303 Pearce & Silva op cit. n34 at 12.  
304 Ibid.  
51 
 
that it simply did not address the ‘inherent inequality of bargaining power between 
the employer as owner of the means of production and employees, who were 
entirely dependent on supply and demand for their welfare and job security’.305   
However, an unfortunate backlash of such interventions is that the business of 
becoming an employer became more expensive.  This has arguably led to what the 
International Labour Organisation has termed the problem of ‘disguised 
employment’.306  Theron asserts that the adoption of the Labour Relations Act307 
(“LRA”) and the establishment of the CCMA in South Africa, coupled with increased 
trade union militancy during the 1980s and 1990s, ‘provided an added incentive to 
firms to externalize’ the non-core aspects of their operations thereby avoiding the 
costs associated with traditional employment.308  Accordingly, like the US, the South 
African labour market has also seen the erosion of the traditional work relationship. 
However, notwithstanding this erosion, labour protections in South Africa still attach 
to employee status.  This issue is discussed further in Chapter Seven of this 
dissertation. 
Having briefly established some of the similarities between the developments 
of US labour law and that of South Africa, the remainder of this Chapter provides an 
overview of South African labour legislation for the purpose of laying the foundation 
to examine the core research question of this study namely, are Uber drivers 
employees in terms of South African labour legislation.  Part I of this Chapter 
examines the key labour statutes in South Africa, namely the LRA, the Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act309 (“BCEA”) and the Employment Equity Act310 
(“EEA”).  Part II examines the statutory presumption of employment contained in 
section 200A of the LRA and section 83A of the BCEA, respectively as well as the 
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common law tests of employment.  Part III provides a brief overview of the 
shortcomings of the current tests of employment in South Africa.   
I. SOUTH AFRICAN LABOUR LEGISLATION 
Grogan notes that the South African legislature has adopted three methods of 
addressing the inherent inequality between employees and employers namely, by 
the imposition of minimum conditions of employment, the promotion of collective 
bargaining and the development of ‘special tribunals to create equitable rules for the 
workplace, with the power to enforce those rules’.311  The LRA, the BCEA and the 
EEA, amongst others, are the embodiment of this legislative strategy.   
The LRA, BCEA and EEA have been promulgated in terms of the 
Constitution.312  In terms of section 39 of the Constitution, a court, tribunal or forum 
must promote the spirit purport and objects of the Bill of Rights when interpreting 
any legislation and when developing the common law.  Sections 18 (Freedom of 
association), 22 (Freedom of trade, occupation and profession) and 23 (Labour 
relations) of the Bill of Rights are of particular importance in the context of South 
African labour law. 
The BCEA establishes basic conditions of employment relating to hours of 
work313, overtime,314 leave entitlements (annual, sick, maternity and family 
responsibility leave),315 and the minimum notice that must be given by an employer 
in order to terminate an employee’s contract of employment.316 
The LRA regulates collective bargaining, unfair labour practices and unfair 
dismissals and establishes remedies and dispute resolution procedures for the 
enforcement of the rights contained therein.  The LRA seeks to promote collective 
bargaining by extending rights to employees, employers, trade unions and 
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employer’s organisations and establishing a framework within which these role 
players can achieve their objectives.317   
In terms of section 4, every employee has the right to form and/or join a trade 
union and to participate in the lawful activities of that trade union.318  Section 5(1) 
provides a catch-all protection to employees in that it stipulates that ‘no person may 
discriminate against an employee for exercising any right conferred by [the LRA]’.  
The effect of section 5, read in its entirety, is that an employer may not hire or fire 
an employee based on his or her trade union membership or activities.319  However, 
arguably one of the most important features of the LRA in the context of collective 
bargaining is the fact that participation in a protected strike does not constitute a 
breach of contract, as it did under the common law.320  The consequence is that 
employees who engage in protected strike action are immune from civil liability and 
are protected against dismissal and other disciplinary measures.321 
The LRA further protects the right not to be subjected to unfair labour practices 
or unfairly dismissed.322  In terms of section 186(2)(c) an ‘an unfair labour practice’ 
would include an ‘unfair act or omission that arises between an employer and an 
employee involving’ amongst others the ‘unfair suspension of an employee or any 
other unfair disciplinary action short of dismissal in respect of an employee’.  An 
employer that is found to have committed an unfair labour practice may be liable to 
pay a compensation award equivalent to 12 months’ of the employee’s 
remuneration.323 
The definition of ‘dismissal’ in section 186(1) of the LRA includes the situation 
where an employer terminates employment with or without notice, amongst others.  
The LRA distinguishes between two categories of dismissals namely, ‘automatically 
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unfair dismissals’324 and ‘other unfair dismissals’.325  The first carries a greater 
sanction for employers than the second.326  Section 187 provides that –  
‘(1)   A dismissal is ‘automatically unfair’ if the employer, in dismissing the employee, 
acts contrary to section 4 or, if the reason for the dismissal is –  
a) that the employee participated in or supported, or indicated an intention to 
participate or support, a strike or protest action that complies with the 
provisions of Chapter IV;  
b) that the employee refused, or indicated an intention to refuse, to do any 
work normally done by an employee who at the time was taking part in a 
strike that complies with the provisions of Chapter IV or was locked out, 
unless the work was necessary to prevent an actual danger to life, 
personal safety or health;  
c) a refusal by an employee to accept a demand in respect of any matter of 
mutual interest between them and their employer;  
d) that the employee took action, or indicated an intention to take action, 
against the employer by –  
i. exercising any right conferred by [the LRA]; or  
ii. participating in any proceedings in term s of [the LRA];  
e) the employee’s pregnancy, intended pregnancy, or any reason related to 
her pregnancy;  
f) that the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or 
indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, 
general, sex, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, 
disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language, 
marital status or family responsibility;  
g) a transfer, or a reason related to a transfer contemplated in section 197 or 
197; or 
h)  a contravention of the Protected Disclosures Act, 2000, by the employer, 
on account of an employee having made a protected disclosure defined in 
that Act.’  
Finally, an important feature of the LRA is its establishment of special tribunals 
and procedures for the adjudication of labour disputes. 327  The key bodies in this 
regard are the CCMA, Labour Courts and Labour Appeal Courts.  Being established 
in terms of the LRA, the CCMA only has jurisidiction to hear disputes concerning 
employees as contemplated in section 213 of the LRA.  
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The stated purpose of the EEA is to ‘eliminate discrimination in the workplace 
and promote affirmative action.’328  The EEA is divided into two parts.  The first part 
prohibits unfair discrimination and provides remedies to individual employees who 
are unfairly discriminated against.  Section 6 provides that –  
‘No person may unfairly discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any 
employment policy or practice, on one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, 
pregnancy, marital status, family responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual 
orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV status, conscience, belief, political opinion, 
culture, language, birth or on any other arbitrary ground.’  
The second part of the EEA deals with affirmative action and ‘elevates it to a 
mandatory policy’ for designated employers.329 
As in the US, employment status is the key to the suit of protections afforded 
by South African labour legislation, discussed above.  Both the LRA and the BCEA 
expressly exclude independent contractors from their ambit and define an 
‘employee’ to mean –   
a) any person, excluding an independent contractor, works for another 
person or for the State and who receives or is entitled to receive, any 
remuneration; and 
b) any other person who in any manner assist in carrying on or conducting 
the business of an employer.’330 [emphasis added] 
The EEA adopts a similar definition of ‘employee’ the wording being slightly 
different to that contained in the LRA and the BCEA.331  The Courts have held that 
both subparagraphs (a) and (b) of the definition of an ‘employee’ exclude 
independent contractors.332  It has been held that the form of as assistance 
contemplated in subsection (b) is that rendered by an employee to an employer and 
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‘does not extend to assistance of the kind which is rendered by independent 
contractors’.333 
II. THE ‘DOMINANT IMPRESSION TEST’ AND STATUTORY 
PRESUMPTIONS OF EMPLOYMENT  
Initially, the primary enquiry was the extent of control exercised by a putative 
employer over a worker (‘supervision and control test’)334  The test later developed 
to examine the extent to which the work performed by the worker formed an integral 
part of the employer’s organisation (‘organisation or integration test’).335  The test 
currently applied by the South African courts is the ‘dominant impression test’336 
which examines the ‘nature of the relationship in its entirety and weighs up different 
factors’337 to determine whether the overall impression of the relationship weighs in 
favour of an employment relationship.  This is confirmed in item 27 of the ‘Code of 
Good Practice: Who is an Employee’ (“the Code of Good Practice”),338  a 
guideline published by the National National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (“NEDLAC”), in terms of section 200A of the LRA.  
In State Information Technology Agency (Pty) Ltd v Commission for 
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration & others339 (“SITA v CCMA”) the Labour 
Appeal Court held that there are three primary criteria which determine whether an 
employment relationship exists between a worker and a putative employer namely –  
1) an employer’s right to supervision and control;  
2) whether an employee forms an integral part of the organisation with the 
employer; and 
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3) the extent to which the employee was economically dependent on the 
employer’
340 
In applying the three criteria, the Labour Appeal Court made reference to ‘the 
reality test’ in terms of which one must have regard to the substance of the 
relationship regardless of its form.  The ‘reality test’ was previously stated by the 
court in Denel (Pty) Ltd v Gerber.341  However, the reality test is not a ‘discrete 
test’342 distinct from the dominant impression test.  Instead, the courts have held 
that the reality test is ‘a measure to be applied to combat disguised employment 
relationships’.343  Accordingly, the dominant impression test remains the prevailing 
common law test for employment status in South Africa344, with the so-called reality 
test serving to guide its application.  
The factors to be considered in applying the dominant impression test were 
established by the court in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner345 the 
Appellate Division as indicia of the difference between employees and independent 
contractors.  These factors have been incorporated into the Code of Good 
Practice346 in the form depicted in Figure 1 below.  
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Figure 1 
  
  
Employee Independent Contractor 
1. Object of the contract is to render personal 
services. 
Object of contract is to perform a specified work or 
produce a specified result. 
2. Employee must perform services personally. Independent contractor may usually perform through 
others. 
3. Employer may choose when to make use of 
services of employee. 
Independent contractor must perform work (or produce 
result) within period fixed by contract. 
4. Employee obliged to perform lawful 
commands and instructions of employer. 
Independent contractor is subservient to the contract, not 
under supervision or control of employer. 
5. Contract terminates on death of employee. Contract does not necessarily terminate on death of 
employee. 
6. Contract also terminates on expiry of period 
of service in contract. 
Contract terminates on completion of work or production 
of specified result. 
 
In keeping with ILO recommendation number 198,347 the legislature has 
created a presumption of employment which applies to a worker who earns below a 
certain threshold.348  The current threshold is R205 433.30.349  A person who earns 
below the threshold amount is deemed to be an employee of the putative employer 
if i) he or she establishes that he or she works for or renders services to the putative 
employer and ii) one or more of the seven factors are present.350  It is then for the 
employer to rebut the presumption of employment by leading evidence that the 
employee is an independent contractor.  The factors contained in sections 200A 
and 83A of the LRA and BCEA, respectively, are enumerated in Part II of Chapter 
Six below and accordingly are not restated here.   
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The Code of Good Practice, referred to above, is intended to serve as 
guideline to decision makers in determining employment status for the purposes of 
labour legislation.  In terms of Item 1 of the Code of Good Practice, its stated 
purposes are -   
a) to promote clarity and certainty as to who is an employee for the purposes of the 
Labour Relations Act and other labour legislation;  
b) to set out the interpretive principles contained in the Constitution, labour 
legislation and binding international standards that apply to the interpretation of 
labour legislation, including the determination of who is an employee; 
c) to ensure that a proper distinction is maintained between employment 
relationships which are regulated by labour legislation and independent 
contracting;  
d) to ensure that employees - who are in an unequal bargaining position in relation 
to their employer - are protected through labour law and are not deprived of these 
protections by contracting arrangements;  
e) to assist persons applying and interpreting labour law to understand and interpret 
the variety of employment relationships present in the labour market including 
disguised employment, ambiguous employment relationships, atypical (or non-
standard) employment and triangular employment relationships. 
The US labour system recognises a variety of common law tests which find 
application depending on the statute in question and the jurisdiction in which the 
dispute has arisen.351  In contrast, the ‘dominant impression’ test is the prevailing 
test of employment status in South African labour law and finds application 
regardless of the labour statute in question or the jurisdiction in which the dispute 
has arisen.  
However, like the US, the tests that have been developed at common law in 
South Africa hail from a time when employment looked very different to the way it 
does today.  In the circumstances, it might be argued that the South African tests of 
employment are also ‘outmoded’ in the context of the on-demand economy.   
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CHAPTER 6: THE STATUS OF UBER DRIVERS UNDER SOUTH 
AFRICAN LAW? 
As it stands there has not been a definitive pronouncement on the status of 
Uber drivers in South Africa.  The case of Uber SA v NUPSAW352 concerned a 
review application brought by Uber SA, a company that ‘marketing and support 
services’ to Uber BV.353  Uber BV, a company incorporated in the Netherlands 
which owns and operates the Uber App was not a party to the proceedings in the 
CCMA nor the Labour Court.354  In the CCMA, the Commissioner ruled that the 
CCMA did have jurisdiction to hear the unfair dismissal disputes referred by the 
Uber drivers as the Uber drivers were employees in terms of section 213 of the LRA 
and we employees of Uber SA.   
The Achilles heel of the Uber drivers’ case in the CCMA was the fact that they 
had not joined Uber BV as a party to the proceedings and that the Commissioner 
thereafter proceeded to conflate the disctintion between Uber BV and Uber SA in 
her in limine ruling.  As Judge Andre van Niekerk notes in the Labour Court 
decision, ‘each of the building blocks of the drivers’ case pertains to Uber BV and 
not Uber SA’.355  In the circumstances, the Labour Court could not consider whether 
the Uber drivers were employees of Uber BV nor could it consider whether the Uber 
drivers’ deactivation from the Uber App amounted to an unfair dismissal in terms of 
the LRA.    
In the absence of a definitive pronouncement on the status of Uber drivers in 
South Africa, this Chapter seeks to determine whether Uber drivers can be 
classified as employees in terms of South African law.  In order to do so, the 
analysis draws on the reasoning in the judgments of O’Connor v Lyft356 and Razak v 
Uber.357 Although the case of Cotter v Lyft358 does not involve Uber drivers, but 
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rather Lyft drivers the reasoning of Judge Chhabria is useful because both Uber and 
Lyft operate in a similar manner.  In addition, the companies and drivers are seen to 
have advanced similar arguments in their motions for summary judgment.   
In addition, the analysis will rely on the judgment of Uber SA v NUPSAW359 
and the findings of the Commissioner contained therein.  Despite the fact that the 
Commissioner conflated the distinction between Uber SA and Uber BV, her 
reasoning is nevertheless valuable because it is clear that the entity that she 
conceived of is the entity that owns and operates the Uber App and communicates 
with Uber drivers in relation thereto.  Although the reasoning was incorrect in law, 
because the incorrect party had been cited, it is conceivable that given Uber’s 
global reach its company structure would not be common knowledge.   
Part I examines the case of Uber SA v NUPSAW.360  Part II contains the 
analysis of whether Uber drivers are employees in terms of South African law.  The 
abovementioned cases as well as Mokoena’s361 academic findings are relied upon 
in Part II of this Chapter to construct an idea of what a South African decision maker 
might find in respect of the classification of Uber drivers.  An analysis of the factors 
contained in the statutory presumptions of employment362 against the findings in the 
US courts reveals that many of the factors can be interpreted to go either way.  In 
other words, some factors cut in favour of employee status whilst others cut in 
favour of independent contractor status.  Part III examines the challenges faced by 
South African labour law in classifying workers in the on-demand economy, such as 
Uber drivers.  It will be argued in Part III that while South Africa does not share the 
problem of a multiplicity of conflicting tests that the US has, its common law test is 
somewhat outdated in the context of the ‘uberfied’ work relationship. 
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I. UBER SA v NUPSAW  
The Uber drivers had referred an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA 
alleging that that their deactivation from the Uber App constituted an unfair 
dismissal in terms of the LRA.363  The CCMA, being established in terms of the 
LRA, only has jurisdiction to adjudicate unfair dismissal disputes if the complainant 
is an ‘employee’ as defined in section 213 of the LRA.   
In the CCMA proceedings, Uber SA objected to the CCMA’s jurisdiction to 
hear the matter on the basis that the Uber drivers were not employees of Uber 
SA.364  Uber SA denied that there was any contractual relationship between Uber 
SA and the drivers.365  It argued that any relevant contractual relationship existed 
between the Uber drivers and Uber BV which was not a party to the proceedings.366  
Uber SA further argued that in any event, Uber drivers were not employees of Uber 
BV but rather independent contractors.367  The Commissioner dismissed Uber SA’s 
jurisdictional challenge and issued a ruling that it did have jurisdiction to adjudicate 
the Uber driver’s unfair dismissal disputes on the basis that the Uber drivers were 
employees as contemplated in section 213 of the LRA and were employed by Uber 
SA.368 
The Commissioner applied what she referred to as the ‘reality of the 
relationship test’ being what she considered to be a ‘new comprehensive test’ 
introduced by the Code of Good Practice and held that –  
 the drivers render personal services to Uber SA in that they are 
required to be on-boarded personally, drive in their own name and 
may not out-source the driving to a third party;369  
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 the work relationship is indefinite as long as the driver complies 
with the requirements;370 
 the drivers are subject to the control of Uber SA in that Uber SA 
controls the manner in which they work by setting clear standards 
and performance requirements (in particular Uber SA’s deactivation 
policy).  In addition, Uber SA exercises control through technology 
(rider ratings);371 
 the drivers cannot source riders independently nor 
independently determine the fare that is to be charged in respect 
thereof;372 
 the drivers were economically dependent on Uber SA;373 and 
 the drivers were an essential part of Uber SA’s service.374 
On review, the Labour Court found that although the test applied by the 
Commissioner was unclear it bore a close resemblance to the ‘dominant 
impression’ test.375  In this regard, Judge van Niekerk was careful to state that the 
Code of Good Practice does not constitute a self-standing test in South African law 
and the dominant impression test remains intact.376 
Importantly, the Labour Court held that the Commissioner had conflated the 
distinction between Uber SA and Uber BV, a company incorporated in the 
Netherlands.377  The Labour Court examined the distinction between Uber BV and 
Uber SA and found that Uber BV, as the owner and operator of the Uber App, was 
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the contracting party in all of the agreements concluded by the Uber drivers.378  In 
addition, Uber BV controlled the ‘on-boarding’, deactivation and payment 
procedures.379  Uber SA is a South African entity that provides ‘marketing and 
support services’ to Uber BV.380  Accordingly, no contractual relationship exists 
between Uber drivers and Uber SA.381  Indeed, the Labour Court held that ‘each of 
the building blocks of the drivers’ case pertains to Uber BV and not Uber SA’.382   
The Labour Court ultimately set aside the Commissioner’s in limine ruling and 
substituted it with its own.383  The effect of the court’s substitution order was that 
Uber SA’s objection to the jurisdiction of the CCMA was upheld and the Uber 
driver’s referrals were dismissed.384  In the circumstances, the question of whether 
Uber drivers are employees of Uber BV under South African law remains to be 
determined, as Judge van Niekerk notes –  
‘whether the drivers are employees of Uber BV (either alone or in a co-employment 
relationship with another or other parties), or whether they are independent contractors 
of Uber BV, is a manner that remains for decision on another day.’385 
 
II. ARE UBER DRIVERS EMPLOYEES OR INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS 
UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN LAW?  
a) The Presumption of Employment – s200A of the LRA and s83A of the 
BCEA 
A worker must satisfy three requirements in order for the statutory presumption 
contained in sections 200A and 83A of the LRA and BCEA respectively, to apply.  
The worker must establish that –  
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 he or she earns below the threshold amount;  
 he or she renders services to another person; and 
 that one of the seven factors are present.386   
The South African statutory presumptions of employment are similar to the 
presumption of employment created by the Borello test under California law albeit 
with some added features.  In terms of the Borello test a worker is presumed to be 
an employee once he or she establishes that he or she renders services to another 
person.387 
In the absence of empirical evidence regarding the average earnings of Uber 
drivers in South Africa it is not possible to say whether Uber drivers generally earn 
below or above the threshold amount.  Uber drivers are entitled to work as much or 
as little as they choose.388  Accordingly, it may be that some Uber drivers earn 
below the threshold amount whereas others may earn above the threshold amount.  
Ultimately this will have to be determined on a case by case basis.  This Chapter 
proceeds on the assumption that some Uber drivers may earn below the threshold 
amount and examines whether they would be able to establish that they are 
presumptive employees under South African law.  
An Uber partner-driver who meets the threshold requirements will first have to 
establish that he or she renders a service to Uber.  In O’Connor v Uber the court 
found that the Uber drivers did render a service to Uber and were accordingly 
presumptive employees under California law.389  Central to the Judge Chen’s 
finding in this regard was the rejection of Uber’s argument that the it was not a 
transportation company but rather a ‘pure “technology company” that merely 
generated “leads” for its transportation providers through its software’.390   
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Lyft, a company that markets itself and functions similarly to Uber in the US, 
advanced a similar strain of this argument in Cotter v Lyft by arguing that the drivers 
did not perform a service for Lyft but rather to Lyft’s riders.391  Lyft argued that it 
merely furnished drivers with the platform to connect with riders.392  However, the 
court found that this argument was ‘not a serious one’ as Lyft concerns itself with 
more than simply connecting drivers with riders.393  Instead, Lyft is seen to actively 
market itself to riders as an ‘on-demand ride service’ and seeks out those 
customers.394 
It is likely that Uber would advance a similar argument before a South African 
decision-maker.  In Uber SA v NUPSAW the Labour Court records that in the 
CCMA proceedings Uber SA argued that riders contract with drivers independently, 
which argument was ultimately rejected by the Commissioner.395  In the light of the 
foregoing, it could be argued that a South African decision-maker might find that 
Uber drivers render services to Uber BV, thus satisfying the second leg of the 
statutory presumptions of employment.   
The final leg of the enquiry turns on whether a worker can establish that one of 
the seven factors listed in section 200A(1) of the LRA, and mirrored in section 
83A(1) of the BCEA, are present.  These factors are applied to the Uber / driver 
relationship and are discussed in turn below. 
 The manner in which the person works is subject to the control or 
direction of another person396 
The extent to which Uber drivers are subject to the control or direction of Uber in 
the performance of their transportation services has been the subject of contention 
in the US.  The key aspects of the Uber work relationship that have been relied 
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upon by drivers to asset that Uber exercises a significant amount of control over the 
manner in which Uber drivers perform their work are the ‘suggestions’ provided by 
Uber as to the manner in which rides are to be completed397 and the fact that Uber 
may suspend or deactivate drivers if their performance ratings fall below a certain 
threshold.398 
In O’Connor v Uber Judge Chen found that the ‘suggestions’ provided by Uber 
were written in the language of command and carried with them the sanction of 
suspension or deactivation if a driver’s failure to comply with them resulted in low 
performance ratings. 399  In addition, the fact that the rider ratings and feedback 
function essentially rendered Uber drivers observable at all times could be an 
indicator that Uber exerts a tremendous amount of control over the manner and 
means that drivers carry out rides. 400   The court held although this question was 
‘hotly disputed’ between the parties, there was evidence to suggest that Uber did 
exercise significant control over the manner and means that drivers were required 
to carry out rides.401 
The Commissioner likewise found that Uber drivers are subject to the control of 
Uber in that Uber sets ‘clear standards and performance requirements’.402  In 
addition, the Commissioner found that the drivers were controlled through 
technology, being a reference to the Uber App.403 
In Razak v Uber404 Judge Baylson took a different view.  While the court in 
O’Connor v Uber405 found that the extent of Uber’s control remained in dispute 
between the parties, Judge Baylson held that there were ‘significant indications… 
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that Uber does not exercise substantial control over its drivers.’406  The fact that 
Uber drivers are permitted to hire subcontractors, work for competing companies 
and are ‘completely free to determine their working hours’ were some of the aspects 
of the work relationship that the Judge found to weigh in favour of independent 
contractor status.407  In addition, Judge Baylson interpreted the ‘suggestions’ 
provided by Uber as to the manner in which rides are to be carried out as a 
mechanism to ensure the safety of its riders and not an indication of its control over 
the drivers.408   
The Labour Appeal Court has confirmed in Parliament of the RSA v Charlton409 
that there can be instances where an employment relationship exists 
notwithstanding the fact that there is a relatively low degree of control.  In addition, 
Item 18(a) of the Code of Good Practice provides that –   
‘The factor of control or direction will generally be present if the applicant is required to 
obey the lawful and reasonable commands, orders or instructions of the 
employer or the employer‘s personnel (for example, managers or supervisors) as to the 
manner in which they are to work… It is an indication of an employment relationship that 
the “employer” retains the right to choose which tools, staff, raw materials, 
routines, patents or technology are used. Likewise, the fact that an employer is 
entitled to take disciplinary action against the person as a result of the manner in 
which the person works is a strong indication of an employment relationship.’410 
It may be that a South African decision maker takes the view adopted in 
O’Connor v Uber that Uber drivers are obliged to follow the ‘suggestions’ provided 
by Uber given that they are written in the language of command and carry the 
sanction of deactivation from the Uber App if not followed. 411  On this view, a South 
African decision maker might find that the manner in which Uber drivers work is 
subject to the control and direction of Uber.412  However, it is also possible that such 
a decision-maker might follow the approach in Razak v Uber.413  It could be argued 
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that this factor could go either way, depending on the way in which a decision 
maker interprets this aspect of the Uber / driver relationship.   
In O’Connor v Uber the court was not required to determine whether Uber’s right 
to suspend or deactivate Uber drivers constituted disciplinary.  Similarly, the Labour 
Court in Uber SA v NUPSAW was also not required to determine this question.414  
Should a South African decision maker find that deactivation or suspension from the 
Uber App constitutes disciplinary action, it would be a strong indication of an 
employment relationship, as indicated in the Code of Good Practice.415 
Notwithstanding the fact that Uber drivers provide their own vehicles, drivers will 
not be activated on the Uber App until their vehicle has been approved during the 
on-boarding process.416  Uber provides the Uber App, the critical tool for the Uber 
drivers to perform their service.  It could also be argued that Uber, in controlling the 
amount of drivers that are permitted in a particular zone, such as the airport,417 
effectively controls its driver’s routines.   
In the light of the foregoing, it is unclear whether an Uber driver would be able to 
establish that the manner in which he or she works subject to the direction and 
control of Uber.  It could be argued that many of the building blocks of this factor are 
open to interpretation by the relevant decision-maker.  
 The person’s hours of work are subject to the control or direction of 
another person418 
Item 18(b) of the Code of Good Practice states that –  
‘Sufficient control or direction may be present if the contract between the parties determines 
the total number of hours that the person is required to work within a specified period.  
Flexible working time arrangements are not incompatible with an employment 
relationship’419 
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The service agreements concluded between Uber and its drivers provide that 
Uber has the right ‘at all times and at Uber’s sole discretion, to reclaim prohibit, 
suspend, limit or otherwise restrict the Transportation Company [partner] and/or the 
Driver from accessing or using the [Uber App].’420  One of the hallmarks of the Uber 
/ driver relationship is that Uber drivers are permitted to work as much or as little as 
they choose.421  But, practically there are consequences for Uber drivers who 
decline rides too often or remain inactive on the Uber App for too long namely the 
possibility of being ‘deactivated’ or ‘archived’.422   
A South African decision-maker might interpret Uber’s right to deactivate or 
suspend drivers, coupled with its deactivation policies, as a clause that effectively 
determines the total number of hours that Uber drivers are required to work within a 
specified period.  The extent to which a driver will be able to establish this factor 
would depend on whether or not a South African decision-maker accepts this or a 
similar interpretation of Uber’s right to deactivate or suspend drivers.  
 In the case of a person who works for an organisation, the person is a 
part of that organisation;423 
In O’Connor v Uber one of the reasons advanced for the court’s finding that the 
Uber drivers were presumptive employees under California law was the fact that the 
drivers formed an integral part of Uber’s business indeed ‘Uber simply would not be 
a viable business entity without its drivers’.424 
However, if one accepts Uber’s argument that the drivers are in business for 
themselves and that Uber merely licenses the Uber App to them then the picture 
changes slightly in light of item 18(c) of the Code of Good.  Item 18(c) provides that 
a person who supplies services to another person ‘as part of conducting their own 
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business does not form part of the employer’s organisation’.425  It further provides 
that some of the factors which indicate that a worker operates his or her own 
business are that they bear the risks ordinarily borne by an employer namely, ‘bad 
workmanship, poor performance, price hikes and time over-runs’.426 
Expanding on this, if it is accepted that Uber drivers are in business for 
themselves then the services that they provide, transportation services, form part of 
conducting their own business.  In addition, an Uber driver who performs badly in 
carrying out rides bears the brunt of poor customer ratings (being deactivation or 
suspension from the Uber App).  Likewise, if Uber increases its rates the driver 
suffers the consequences.   
It could be argued that if a South African decision-maker accepts the position 
that Uber drivers are in business for themselves, as the court in Razak v Uber427 
essentially did, then the existence of this factor would not be established.  
Accordingly, it could be argued that this factor can arguably go either way.  
 The person has worked for that other person for an average of at least 
40 hours per month over the last three months;428 
It is the hallmark of the Uber / driver relationship that drivers are permitted to 
drive as much or as little as they like, notwithstanding the consequences discussed 
above. 429  In the circumstances, the extent to which an Uber driver can establish 
this factor will depend on the circumstances of each case.  
 The person is economically dependent on the other person for whom 
that person works or renders services;430 
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Benjamin asserts that economic dependence relates to the ‘entrepreneurial 
position of the person in the marketplace’. 431  A genuinely self-employed person is 
not economically dependent on another person where he or she retains the right to 
work for others.432  Accordingly, the fact that a person is contractually bound to 
supply services to one person is a strong indicator that he or she is an employee.  
In addition, a person’s dependence on another person for the supply of work is also 
a strong indication of an employment relationship.433  These principles are echoed 
in item 18(e) of the Code of Good Practice.434 
In addition to being able to work as much or as little as they like, it is a material 
term of the service agreements concluded between Uber and its drivers that the 
drivers are permitted to work for other individuals or entities.435  This is a strong 
indication of independent contractor status.  It may be that certain Uber drivers elect 
to work for Uber alone, but it could be argued that this ultimately remains the 
driver’s choice as they are not prohibited from doing so.  Accordingly, a South 
African decision-maker might find that this factor is not present in the relationship 
between Uber and its drivers.   
 the person is provided with tools of trade or work equipment by the 
other person;436 
Uber drivers (at least partner-drivers) are required to provide their own vehicles 
in order to join the Uber App.  Accordingly, a South African decision maker might 
find that this factor is not present in the relationship between Uber and its drivers.  
However, a South African decision-maker might also find that the Uber App, 
provided by Uber, is a critical tool of trade or work sufficient to establish the 
existence of this principle.  This, like many other factors can arguably go either way 
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depending on the way in which the decision-maker conceives of the nature and 
importance of the Uber App.   
 the person only works for or renders services to one person.437 
Item 18(g) of the Code of Good Practice provides that ‘it is not relevant that work 
is permitted in terms of the relationship or whether it involves “moonlighting” 
contrary to the terms of the relationship.’438  Accordingly, an Uber driver may be 
able to establish this principle, notwithstanding that he or she is permitted to work 
for others, if as a matter of fact he or she only renders services to Uber.   
In conclusion, having assessed the abovementioned factors, it is likely that an 
Uber driver that earns below the threshold amount would be able to establish the 
existence of at least one of the factors analysed above and would be classified as a 
presumptive employee in terms of sections 200A of the LRA in consequence.  
However, it is also clear from the above analysis that the ‘uberfied’ work relationship 
does not neatly fit the factors enumerated above.  
b) Application of the ‘dominant impression’ test  
In respect of those Uber drivers who earn above the threshold, a South African 
decision-maker would be required to apply the dominant impression test established 
in Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner.439  Mokoena finds that Uber 
drivers render personal services to Uber which services must be performed 
personally and at the behest of Uber.440   In addition, Uber drivers are obliged to 
obey the commands and instructions of Uber by virtue of the fact that their failure to 
do so carries the sanction of deactivation or suspension from the Uber App.441  
                                               
437 Labour Relations Act, No. 66 of 1995, s200A(g).   
438 Code of Good Practice supra n338, Item 18(g). 
439 Smit v Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner supra n337; Code of Good Practice supra n338, 
Item 27. 
440 Mokoena op cit. n361 at 1581.  
441 Ibid.  
74 
 
Finally the contract between Uber and its drivers terminates upon the death of the 
employee.442   
Of the three factors enumerated in SITA v CCMA443 the extent to which Uber 
has the right to supervise and control its drivers in the performance of their 
transportation services is the subject of debate.  This has been discussed above 
however the crucial point to be made is that the answer does not appear to be clear 
cut.  In addition, the extent to which Uber drivers are economically dependent on 
Uber may also go either way depending on the facts of each case.  It has however 
been widely accepted in the US courts that Uber drivers do form an integral part of 
Uber’s business.444 
III. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CHALLENGE 
The fact that many of the factors, examined in this Part, can be interpreted to 
fit either construction of Uber drivers (ie that Uber drivers are employees or 
independent contractors) suggests that perhaps the South African common law 
tests are also outmoded in the context of the on-demand economy, as it has been 
argued in the case of the US common law tests.445  Many of the aspects of the 
‘uberfied’ work relationship do not seem to accord with the factors enumerated in 
section 200A(1) of the LRA or the common law tests.   
However, it can be argued that this problem is not new to South African labour 
law.  Writing in 2004, Benjamin asserts that the dominant impression test has been 
criticised since its formulation in 1979.  In 1980, Mureinik argued that the dominant 
impression test ‘fails to say anything about the legal nature of the contract of 
employment and gives no assistance in difficult cases on the border… between 
employment and self-employment.’446  Brassey has argued that the dominant 
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impression test simply establishes that a decision must be taken in light of the 
relevant factors.447  These sentiments were repeated in the case of Medical 
Association of SA & Others v Minister of Health & Another448 wherein Zondo AJ 
held that the test was ‘unsatisfactory because of the uncertainty it cerates’.449 
It will be argued in Chapter Seven below that in essence the ‘gig’ workers and 
the workers of the twentieth century who occupied the ‘grey area between 
employment and self-employment.’450  For all intents and purposes Uber drivers, 
and their contemporaries who perform ‘work on-demand via apps’,451 occupy an 
awkward space between employees and independent contractors, being not quite 
one construction but not quite the other either.452 
In addressing the core research question of this study, it is argued that Uber 
drivers are not quite employees in terms of section 213 of the LRA but are not quite 
independent contractors either.  It has been said that an Uber driver who earns 
below the threshold amount is likely to establish the existence of at least one of the 
factors enumerated in section 200A LRA.  However, the fact that many of the other 
aspects of the work relationship seem to point in the direction of independent 
contractor status suggests that Uber might successfully rebut this presumption.  As 
to those Uber drivers who do not earn below the threshold amount, the factors do 
not lend themselves to a certain outcome.  Accordingly, it is argued that the South 
African tests of employment do not adequately cover the ‘uberfied’ work relationship 
and due to this uncertainty Uber drivers are not adequately protected by South 
African labour laws.   
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS - CLASSIFYING 
UBER DRIVERS IN SOUTH AFRICA - AN ÜBERIFICATION OF THE 
STATUS QUO?  
 
At the outset of this dissertation it was remarked that ‘employment is not what 
it used to me’, a statement from Theron writing in 2003.453  There can be no doubt 
that companies like Uber, Lyft, TaskRabbit and others have significantly changed 
the manner in which workers earn income through the use of mobile and web 
applications.  Even those workers located in the ‘grey area between employment 
and self-employment’454 would have at some time or another come face to face with 
their employer and may have even rendered services in the hirer’s workplace 
alongside traditional employees.   
Today, the picture is quite different for many workers who provide services 
either via ‘crowd work’455 or ‘work on-demand via apps.’456  In the absence of any 
central dispatch units, it is likely that Uber drivers may never come into contact with 
Uber personnel other than through the Uber App and the emails generated by Uber 
during the subsistence of the work relationship.  In addition, Uber drivers may never 
come into contact with one another (although human experience tells us that it is 
likely that they would probably come into contact whilst queuing in high demand 
areas).  Accordingly, the image of workers in the on-demand economy as an 
‘invisible’,457 ‘just-in-time’458 workforce is fairly easy to conjure.   
However, as de Stefano notes, the on-demand economy should not be seen 
as a ‘parallel universe’ to the existing labour market.459  Whilst it is true that 
companies like Uber have changed the nature of work de Stefano asserts that 
crowd work and work on-demand via apps forms part of ‘a much vaster trend 
                                               
453 Theron op cit. n1 at 1247.   
454 Benjamin op cit. n45 at 789. 
455 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 1.  
456 Ibid.   
457 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 21.  
458 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 1.  
459 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 6.  
77 
 
towards the casualisation of labour’.460  According to de Stefano, ‘gig’ work ‘shares 
several relevant dimensions with non-standard forms of employment.’461  For 
example, like their casualised counterparts the work performed by ‘gig’ workers is 
often typified by ‘unpredictable working hours and unreliable source of income’.462  
In addition, the ‘intermittent nature of their activity’ means that ‘gig’ workers, even if 
they were to be classified as employees, would be excluded from certain 
employment rights relating to maternity leave, paid leave and full employment 
benefits, amongst others, because those rights are dependent upon length of 
service.463 
Non-standard workers, outside of the on-demand economy, are seen to 
experience the problem of a multiplicity of contracting parties which results in the 
situation where a person may not know who they are actually rendering services 
to.464  The case of Uber SA v NUPSAW465 is arguable case in point in this regard.  It 
has been said that the Achilles heel for the drivers in that case was the fact that 
Uber BV was not cited in the CCMA proceedings.466  But it is conceivable that given 
the global reach of ‘Uber’, in reference to the brand, drivers would not know the 
precise entity with whom they were rendering services to.  On one hand, all of the 
drivers contracts were concluded with Uber BV and all of the ‘suggestions’ came 
from that entity, however on the ground and in the minds of the Uber drivers their 
primary interaction was with Uber SA, a local entity.   
Much of the focus around the Uber worker classification debate has centred 
the binary question of whether Uber drivers are employees or independent 
contractors.  If one is to accept the position that Uber drivers are employees, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are classified as independent contractors by Uber, 
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then one accepts that the Uber / driver relationship is one of disguised employment.  
In terms of ILO Recommendation 198, disguised employment occurs when –  
‘the employer treats an individual as other than an employee in a manner that hides his 
or her true legal status as an employee, and that situations can arise where contractual 
arrangements have the effect of depriving workers of the protection they are due...’467 
The definition of disguised employment seems to suggest that if a decision-
maker were to look beyond the title given to a work relationship it would be clear 
that in fact an employment relationship exists.  It has been argued in Chapter Six 
above that an analysis of the Uber / driver relationship in terms of the current tests 
of employment under South African, and US, labour law, does not lend itself to a 
clear answer.  In some aspects, Uber drivers appear to be employees whilst in 
others they appear to be independent contractors.468  As Judge Chhabria notes in 
Cotter v Lyft the task of classifying drivers in the on-demand economy is akin to 
being ‘handed a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes’.469  
In the circumstances, it can be argued that it is the binary upon which most 
labour systems are built that creates the dilemma that now faces workers in the on-
demand economy, who are arguably a vulnerable class of workers.  The ILO has 
already recognised the concept of ‘dependent self-employment’ in terms of which 
the worker performance services for a business under a contract, other than an 
employment contract, but depends on a pool of clients for his or her income and 
‘may receive direction regarding how the work is to be done’.470  Some jurisdictions 
have also begun to recognise this intermediate category of workers that seem to 
occupy the space between employment and self-employment.   
 
 
                                               
467 R198 Employment Relationship Recommendation, 2006 (No. 198). 
468 See, Chapter Five and Parts II and III of Chapter Six above.   
469 Cotter v Lyft supra n29 at 19.  
470 ‘Disguised employment / Dependent self-employment’ ILO Website available at 
https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/non-standard-employment/WCMS_534833/lang--en/index.htm 
accessed on 9 February 2019.  
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In Canada, a ‘dependent contractor’ is defined as a person who –  
‘whether or not employed under a contract of employment, performs work or services 
for another person on such terms and conditions as they are, in relation to that other 
person, in a position of economic dependence on, and under an obligation to perform 
duties for, that other person.471 
Canada’s approach to extending rights to ‘dependent contractors’ has been to 
generally maintain the binary between independent contractors and employees and 
to ‘either extend or reduce coverage’ to workers with this status through other 
legislation and regulation.472  Accordingly, ‘dependent contractors’ in Canada are 
seen to enjoy collective bargaining rights and minimum standards of work but the 
coverage in areas such as employment equity, occupational health and safety and 
income taxes amongst others is less clear.473  Accordingly Pearce and Silva note 
that the approach that has been adopted in Canada does not offer a ‘universal 
solution’.474   
It is beyond the scope of this study to consider the various solutions to the 
problem of worker classification in the on-demand economy that have been 
examined by various academics.  The ‘dependent contractor’ model employed by 
Canada is but one solution that may extend necessary labour protections ‘gig’ 
workers in the on-demand economy.  It may be that such a model is suited to the 
South African labour market.  Ultimately it will be for the legislature and the judiciary 
to determine.   
 
  
                                               
471 Canadian Labour Code, RSC, 1985, c L – 2, s3.  
472 Pearce & Silva op cit. n34 at 33.  
473 Ibid.  
474 Ibid.   
80 
 
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION 
  
The core research question posed by this study asked whether Uber drivers 
could be classified as employees under South African law.475  The objective of the 
study is to determine whether existing labour laws in South Africa offer adequate 
protection to workers, like Uber drivers, in the on-demand economy.  It has been 
argued that Uber drivers do not neatly fall within the definition of employee in 
section 213 of the LRA.476  However, Uber drivers do not neatly fit the category of 
independent contractor either.477  The fact that the aspects of the ‘uberfied’ work 
relationship do not seem to speak to the factors enumerated in the South African 
tests of employment suggests that perhaps these factors are outdated in the context 
of the on-demand economy.  This is a challenge that South Africa shares with the 
US.  As a consequence of this uncertainty, Uber drivers are not afforded adequate 
protection under existing South African labour laws.  
But, this is not a new problem.  As Benjamin notes the dominant impression 
test has long since been criticised for failing to adequately deal with workers located 
in the ‘grey area between employment and self-employment’.478   It has been 
argued in Chapter Seven, that the on-demand economy should not be viewed as a 
‘parallel universe’ to the existing labour market. 479  Instead, the problems faced by 
‘gig’ workers, like Uber drivers, form part of ‘a much vaster trend towards the 
casualisation of labour’.480  In this sense, it can be said that the type of work 
relationship created by companies like Uber, is simply an ‘uberfication’ of the status 
quo.  In other words, companies like Uber have done no more than give the non-
standard employee a smart phone application with which to earn an income.   
                                               
475 See, Chapter One.   
476 See, Part II of Chapter Six.  
477 Ibid.  
478 Benjamin op cit. n45 at 789. 
479 De Stefano op cit. n3 at 6.   
480 Ibid.  
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This is not to understate the extent to which Uber and companies like it have 
can be seen to have ‘significantly reduced the barriers to reliable, independent 
income.’481  It is undeniable that these platforms have created an alternative means 
for workers, who might otherwise struggle to gain access to traditional forms of 
work, to earn a living.  The big question however is at what cost and how can it be 
addressed?   
Chapter Seven of this study also examined the concept of ‘dependent self-
employment’ as an intermediate category between employment and self-
employment.  It has been said that it is beyond the scope of this minor dissertation 
to address whether this category of worker is suited to the South African context.  
However it can be said that given that Uber drivers seem to occupy an awkward 
space in-between the binary upon which South African labour law rests, this is 
perhaps an option that is worth consideration by the legislature and / or the 
judiciary.  
 
 
  
                                               
481 Cheng op cit. n4 at 17.  
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